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µ)RUWRRORQJYLFWLPVKDYHIHOWWKH\DUHtreated as an afterthought in the criminal justice 
V\VWHP7KLVPXVWFKDQJH«,DPDEVROXWHO\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWYLFWLPVDUHJLYHQEDFN
WKHLUYRLFH«¶'DPLDQ*UHHQ030LQLVWHUIRU9LFWLPV1 
This thesis considers the impact on the legitimacy of the trial of a raft of recent, victim-
centric reforms to the English criminal trial process. For some time the conception of 
the English criminal trial has been as a settled, liberal institution, in the tradition of an 
adversarial conflict between the state and the defendant. The focus of the proceedings 
has been on the defendant, and other than usually being the trigger for an 
investigation, the status of the victim in the trial process has been no different to that 
of any other witness. The legitimation of the process has rested on the liberal 
justification of the deprivation of the liberty of the accused only following conviction in 
a fair system of trial.  
 Over the past two or more decades there has been a marked, accelerating turn 
towards the role of the victim in proceedings, both internationally and domestically. It 
is the contention of this thesis that the host of victim-centric reforms, preoccupied with 
JLYLQJWKHYLFWLPDYRLFHLQWKH(QJOLVKFULPLQDOWULDOGHPRQVWUDWH³QHROLEHUDO´ORJLFVRI
governance according to market-metrics with increased efficiencies and engagement 
with users of the system, responsibilisation of the victim in the trial process, 
individualisation and personalisation of the proceedings and enforcing a zero-
tolerance to the risks posed by criminals.  
The contention of this thesis is that the neoliberal, victim-centric reforms to the 
English criminal trial paradoxically serve to strengthen the liberal conception of the 
criminal trial. Such a liberal conception traditionally champions both the participation 
of the defendant being called to account and due process to protect the defendant 
against the oppressive exercise of state power. Enhanced perceptions of procedural 
fairness to victims in the trial process and the expansion of the audience by opening 
a dialogue between the victim and those in power at points of the trial process that 
                                                          
1
 Ministry of Justice, Improving the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime Response to Consultation 
(CP8(R) 2013) 4. 
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were previously remote to the victim, in no way diminishes the liberal conception but 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
The suicide of Frances Andrade after she gave evidence in a criminal trial against the 
perpetrator of sexual abuse1 raised the problematic issue of the role of victims in the 
English criminal trial, whose traditional focus has been on the defendant. The standard 
account of a criminal trial recognises that the aim is to establish whether the defendant, 
having been charged with one or more criminal offences, has committed the criminal 
acts alleged against them; if so whether they have any defence to their actions and if 
not, to punish the defendant for their criminality.2 The protection of various rights 
accorded to the defendant such as the right to participate in their trial and the right to 
confront those who accuse them, serves to restrain the main aim of the state; 
establishing who can be punished by ensuring accurate verdicts to the requisite 
standard of proof,3 and µDSURSHUGHJUHHRIUHVSHFWIRUWKHGHIHQGDQWDVDFLWL]HQ¶4 
$OWKRXJKLQDGHTXDFLHVLQWKHWULDOSURFHVVIURPWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHKDYHEHHQ
UHYHDOHGIURPDFFRXQWVRIWULDOVLQYROYLQJYXOQHUDEOHSHUSHWUDWRUVOLNH-DPHV%XOJHU¶V
killers,5 including detachment from the proceedings due to the courtroom layout and 
incomprehension of the proceedings due to the use of overly legalistic language and 
unfamiliar practices, the rights accorded to the defendant have been central to criminal 
trial proceedings, forming the basis of liberal claims to legitimacy, to be considered 
further below. 
Over the past two decades it has been suggested that this traditional 
conception of the criminal trial is under attack, with many of the principles embodied 
in the trial process which favour the defendant, such as the right to trial by jury, the 
ULJKWWRVLOHQFHDQGWKHVKLHOGSURWHFWLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFKDUDFWHUEHLQJFKDOOHQJHG
                                                          
1
 3HWHU:DONHUµ)UDQFHV$QGUDGHNLOOHGKHUVHOIDIWHUEHLQJDFFXVHGRIO\LQJVD\VKXVEDQG¶The 
Guardian (London, 10th February 2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/feb/10/frances-
andrade-killed-herself-lying> accessed 2 November 2015. 
2
 Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer and Sandra Marshall, The Trial on Trial: Volume 3: Towards a 
Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Hart Publishing 2007) 4. 
3
 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 confirmed the criminal standard of proof where the prosecution 
EHDUVWKHEXUGHQRISURYLQJWKHIDFWVLQLVVXHDVSURRIµEH\RQGUHDVRQDEOHGRXEW¶ More recently the 
-XGLFLDO&ROOHJHVXJJHVWWKDWMXULHVDUHWROGWKDWµWKHSURVHFXWLRQPXVWPDNH the jury sure that D is 
JXLOW\1RWKLQJOHVVZLOOGR¶-XGLFLDO&ROOHJHµThe Crown Court Compendium¶ (May 2016) 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/crown-court-compendium-part-i-jury-and-
trial-management-and-summing-up.pdf> accessed 8 May 2017. 
4
 Duff, Farmer and Marshall (n 2) 5. 
5
 Blake Morrison, As if (Granta Books 2011). 
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or eroded.6 At the same time there has been a turn towards the role of the victim, both 
internationally and domestically. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
³,&&´ LQFOXGHG JURXQG-breaking victim provisions on the international stage 
regarding protection, participation, and reparations,7 µUHIOHFW>LQJ@DJURZLQJUHFRJQLWLRQ
of victimV¶LQWHUHVWVLQMXGLFLDOPHFKDQLVPV¶8 The participatory provisions embedded 
in the Rome Statute contained elements comparable to domestic, civil law 
jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, which resulted in victims having a legal 
standing in proceedings. Such a standing, as evidenced by specific legal 
representation, the ability to present evidence in court and the making of statements 
for sentencing purposes,9 had no equivalency in English criminal trial proceedings. 
The effectiveness of the declared purpose of delivering justice to victims, though, is 
subject to ongoing academic debate, as the opposing interests of the role of the victim 
and the rights of the defendant to a fair trial collide.10 It has, for example, been 
suggested that the victim-centric measures are in fact a means to promote self-
legitimation of the ICC, with victims being deemed subjects as a matter of law but as 
a matter of fact being subjects of manipulation.11  
In the English criminal trial, unlike in civil law, inquisitorial jurisdictions, there 
has been no particular role accorded to the victim over and above any other witness 
in the proceedings. By pitting the state against the individual, the adversarial nature of 
the trial has not leant itself to bestowing any special status on the victim. Yet over the 
past two decades or more the criminal trial has undergone a number of victim-centric 
UHIRUPVZKLFKSXUSRUW WRJLYHDQHIIHFWLYH µYRLFH¶ WR WKHYLFWLPVRIFULPH LQFULPLQDO
proceedings.12 Measures range from the creation of specific posts to champion the 
ULJKWVRIYLFWLPVVXFKDV WKH9LFWLPV¶&RPPLVVLRQHU WR WHFKQRORJLFDODGYDQFHVWR
                                                          
6
 See for example Duff, Farmer and Marshall (n 2) 1 and Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, 
µ'HIHQGLQJWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH&KDQJLQJ&KDUDFWHURI&ULPH3URFHGXUHDQG
6DQFWLRQV¶2(1) Cr. L. & P. 21, 38. 
7
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998), Articles 68, 75, 
and 79. 
8
 Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (Routledge 2014) 2. 
9
 Moffett (n 8) 95. 
10
 Moffett (n 8) 3. 
11
 From discussions at the Centre for Critical International Law at Kent (Cecil) Second Annual 
:RUNVKRSµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZDQG9LFWLPV¶KHOGDWWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQWDW&DQWHUEXU\RQ
16th May 2014. 
12
 Ministry of Justice, Improving the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime Response to Consultation 




trial procedure easing the burden of evidence giving on victims, for example the use 
of pre-recorded evidence then played in court, and restrictions on what can be asked 
of a victim in cross-examination. These and other reforms are detailed in this chapter 
further below when looking at the recent turn towards the victim in English criminal trial 
proceedings. I have selected two particular reforms to focus on in this thesis 
concerning changes to the role of the victim at either end of the criminal trial process; 
firstly, when the decision is taken not to charge a suspect with a criminal offence and 
secondly, when a defendant is sentenced for their criminal acts. As I shall explain 
below, these two reforms are intended as representative of the swathe of reforms as 
a whole, and have been specifically chosen since they signify two discreet stages of 
the criminal trial that were hitherto remote to the victim. 
Given the current apparent preoccupation with the voice of the victim at all 
stages of the criminal trial process, as evidenced by the recent raft of victim-centric 
reforms, this thesis addresses the enigma of increased focus on victims in a liberal, 
adversarial, defendant-centric conception of the criminal trial, which champions the 
participation of the defendant being called to account and due process to protect the 
defendant against the oppressive exercise of state power. These reforms provoke a 
question about the overall place, purpose and legitimacy of the trial, given its historic 
focus on the defendant. It is my contention that the governmental victim-centric 
reforms reflect neoliberal imperatives including both the personalisation and 
LQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ RI SURFHGXUHV LQ IDYRXU RI WKH YLFWLP DQG WKH YLFWLP¶V LQFUHDVHG
responsibilisation. I seek to understand the neoliberal imperatives driving these 
governmental reforms, to consider their interplay with the liberal trial institution and, 
consequently, their impact on the legitimacy of the trial. The contention of this thesis 
is that despite the view of scholars like Wendy Brown, who suggest that neoliberal 
tendencies undermine liberal public institutions,13 the victim-centric reforms to the 
English criminal trial paradoxically serve to strengthen a liberal conception of its nature 
and legitimacy. Their impact lies in further legitimising the criminal trial through 
enhanced perception of procedural fairness to victims in the trial process, and 
                                                          
13
 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos (Zone Books 2015) 39. 
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expansion of its public audience by opening a dialogue between the victim and those 
in power at key points within the trial process that were previously remote to the victim.  
This thesis divides into four chapters. In this first chapter I trace the rise in the 
prominence of the defendant and the concomitant fall in the role of the victim in liberal 
English criminal trial proceedings before introducing the more recent turn towards the 
vLFWLP¶VYRLFHDQGWKHQHROLEHUDOPRWLYDWLRQVEHKLQGWKLVYROWH-face. In the first section, 
I briefly trace the development of the criminal trial process from trial by ordeal to 
adversarial conflict in order to introduce the liberal justifications underpinnLQJWRGD\¶V
criminal trial which foreground the place of the defendant. In the second section I chart 
the recent turn away from the traditional positioning of victims on the periphery of 
defendant-focused criminal proceedings towards privileging them at all stages in the 
process through a number of victim-centric reforms. In the third section I introduce the 
notion that these reforms embody neoliberal imperatives which I shall consider in more 
detail in the following chapters.  
In the following two chapters I examine in detail two examples of the recent 
victim-centric reforms. Amidst a plethora of measures considered below, these 
reforms demonstrate the impact of victim-centrism on two distinct and different stages 
of the criminal trial which hitherto had very little direct victim involvement, allowing me 
to consider the impact of such reforms across the criminal trial process. The first 
UHIRUPDGGUHVVHGLQFKDSWHUWZRLVWKH9LFWLP¶V5LJKWWR5HYLHZ6FKHPH³9556´
The decision whether to prosecute a suspected perpetrator of criminal conduct is 
WDNHQ E\ WKH &URZQ 3URVHFXWLRQ 6HUYLFH ³&36´ IROORZLQJ DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ E\ WKH
police which is often triggered by a complaint from a victim of crime. Other than a 
UHTXLUHPHQWWRWDNHWKHYLFWLP¶VYLHZVLQWRDFFRXQt, the victim played no role in this 
decision and there was no way to challenge a decision taken not to proceed with a 
prosecution, other than by following the usual channels for making a complaint 
concerning the level of service received from the CPS. The VRRS created a specific 
mechanism for aggrieved victims to challenge a decision taken by the CPS not to 
prosecute. The second reform, which is the subject of chapter three, is the Victim 
3HUVRQDO 6WDWHPHQW ³936´ VFKHPH 7KH GHFLVLRQ RQ KRZ WR SXQLVK D Fonvicted 
defendant is taken by the Magistrates or Judge at the conclusion of a trial or following 
a guilty plea. The VPS scheme formalises a mechanism for the victim to express to 
the sentencing tribunal the impact the offence has had on them and, if they so wish, 
12 
 
provides the opportunity for the victim to read out their statement in court themselves. 
In my analysis of each of these reforms, I consider what prompted the change that 
each brought about, the neoliberal imperatives they embody and their lack of impact 
on the fundamentally liberal nature of the proceedings. 
 In the final chapter I shall consider the impact of these victim-centric reforms 
on the legitimacy of the criminal trial, starting with neoliberal paradigms of legitimacy. 
I suggest that market-centric, consumerist neoliberal models cannot fully handle the 
SDUWLFXODULWLHVRI WKHFULPLQDO WULDO¶V OHJLWLPDWLRQ*LYHQ WKLV , WXUQ WRFRQVLGHU OLEHUDO
accounts, which remain more explanatory in understanding the legitimacy of the trial, 
notwithstanding the neoliberal quality of the trial reforms under investigation. 
Specifically, I conclude that the victim-centric reforms under discussion can be seen 
as expanding or shifting the original sense of the audience or interested party under 
procedural conceptions of legitimation, fostering the dialogic and relational character 
between the power-holder and the audience that underpins liberal conceptions of 
legitimacy.  
 
1. The evolution of the relationship between the liberal conception of the 
criminal trial, the rise of the defendant and the demise of the victim 
The modern criminal trial is widely recognised as embodying liberal imperatives 
in sanctioning the coercive punishment of the defendant who has been fairly convicted 
of committing an offence. When developing a normative theory of the criminal trial,14 
$QWKRQ\'XIIDORQJZLWKKLVWKUHHPDLQFROODERUDWRUVGHVFULEHGWKHYDOXHVDVµFHQWUDO
to the kind of (roughly) liberal political perspectives to which contemporary western 
democracies claim to be commiWWHG¶15 For Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, the 
paradigm conception of criminal justice is a liberal one encompassing the censure of 
                                                          
14
 Anthony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor Tadros collaborated for a three-year 
Arts and Humanities Research Board funded project developing a normative theory of the criminal 
trial entitled The Trial on Trial which culminated in a three volume publication of the same name. The 
VWDWHGDLPRIWKHSURMHFWZDVµWRGHYHORSDQRUPDWLYHWKHRU\WKDWLVDSSURSULDWHWRWKHFRQWH[WLQ
which it is formed and will be applied² that of a twenty-first-century state that purports to be 
democratic and to respect the set of roughly liberal values that, whatever the controversies about their 
precise meaning and application, are the common currency of contemporary legal and political 
GHEDWH¶(n 2) 10. 
15
 Duff, Farmer and Marshall (n 2) 57. 
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actions previously deemed wrongs under the criminal law and the punishment of those 
who have been proven to have committed those wrongs in a criminal court. Such 
proceedings will be fair due to procedural safeguards and their purpose will be to 
decide whether the defendant did the criminal wrongs by conducting a public 
examination of the evidence brought by both sides of the dispute.16 The need to 
µUHVSHFWWKHDXWRQRP\DQGGLJQLW\RILQGLYLGXDOV¶17 in this process also features in the 
underlying values as expounded by Ashworth and Zedner. These values have not 
always underpinned the criminal trial since the requirement to prove guilt based on 
evidence concerning past events has not always been necessary to justify the 
GHSULYDWLRQ RI WKH DFFXVHG¶V OLEHUW\ ,Q WKLV SDUW RI WKH FKDSWHU , FRQVLGHU KRZ WKH
relationship between the liberal conceptions of the trial, the focus of the proceedings 
on the defendant and the demise of the role of the victim have evolved. The 
juxtaposition between the status quo and the recent victim-centric reforms considered 
thereafter brings the issue of legitimacy of the criminal trial to the fore, but this is 
discussed later, in chapter four.  
 2QHRIWKHOLEHUDOYDOXHVLGHQWLILHGE\'XIIDVXQGHUSLQQLQJWRGD\¶VFULPLQDOWULDO
concerns the participation of the defendant who is being called to account, including 
the opportunity to confront their accusers. Although trial by ordeal is not directly 
DQDORJRXVWRWRGD\¶VFULPLQDOWULDOSDUDOOHOVFDQEHGUDZQEHWZHHQWKHWZRSURFHVVHV
particularly in relation to the calling of the accused to account for their actions, albeit 
before God and their local community rather than an impartial tribunal. Trial by ordeal, 
typically trial by fire or by water in medieval Europe until its abolition in 1215, did not 
VHHNWRGLVFRYHUSDVWIDFWVXQOLNHWKHIRFXVRIWRGD\¶VWULDOZKLFKLVVHHNLQJWRHVWDEOLVK
the truth of past events based on the evidence presented to the fact finders by the 
parties to the dispute. Rather it resorted to utilising a physical challenge to resolve a 
GLVSXWHVXFKDVSXWWLQJWKHDFFXVHG¶VKDQGLQDERLOLQJFDXOGURQWRIHWFKDULQJDQG
waiting to see whether their hand burned or not in order to determine guilt,18 without 
reference to the actual facts in dispute. So the determination of guilt rested upon the 
DFFXVHGDOWKRXJKWKHPHWKRGDQGSURRIRIJXLOWZHUHIDUUHPRYHGIURPWRGD\¶VWULDO
process, given that ordeals were unilateral, usually only undertaken by one party to 
                                                          
16
 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, µ'HIHQGLQJWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH&KDQJLQJ
&KDUDFWHURI&ULPH3URFHGXUHDQG6DQFWLRQV¶2(1) Cr. L. & P. 21, 22. 
17
 Ashworth and Zedner (n16) 22. 
18
 Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water (OUP USA 1986) 4. 
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the case and they required that the natural elements behave in an unusual way, hot 
water or iron not burning the innocent for example, or cold water not allowing the guilty 
to sink. TheVH RUGHDOV ZHUH PRUH DLPHG DW GLVFRYHULQJ WKH WUXWK RI WKH DFFXVHG¶V
identity or nature and less the truth of past facts or actions. Michel Foucault 
commented that, as day to day penal practices changed, simply knowing that the 
accused had done wrong and punishing them accordingly was no longer enough.  
Instead, the need to hear the accused give an account of themselves developed.  
According to Foucault:  
Legal justice today has at least as much to do with criminals as with crimes. Or more 
precisely, while, for a long time, the criminal had been no more than the person to 
whom a crime could be attributed and who could therefore be punished, today, the 
crime tends to be no more than the event which signals the existence of a dangerous 
element - that is, more or less dangerous - in the social body.19 
The focus of the ordeal, then, rested on calling the accused to account for the crime 
UDWKHU WKDQRQ WKHDFFXVHG WKHPVHOYHV 7KH LPSRUWDQFHRI WKHDFFXVHG¶VSRVLWLRQ
developed in later centuries.  
The stages leading up to the eventual ordeal contained some familiar elements 
such as the making of an accusation by the victim, which required a prima facie case 
to be established by the victim although proof to back up the accusation was not a 
necessary requirement, and a period of negotiation in front of a court when the 
accused could seek to settle their dispute or advance a defence to the accusation. The 
role of the victim was limited to the initial stages of the ordeal since it was the court 
who would then determine what proof would be required such as what ordeal would 
be faced and how judgment would be reached based on the outcome of the ordeal.20  
With the cessation of trial by ordeal gradually came an increased role for victims 
in proceedings, whilst the defenGDQW¶V SODFH UHPDLQHG D SUHFDULRXV RQH $V
H[SRXQGHGE\3DXO*HZLUW]µWKHHDUOLHVWFRXUWSURFHHGLQJVLQ(QJODQGGHQRPLQDWHG
FULPLQDOZHUH LQIDFWSULYDWHSURVHFXWLRQVEURXJKWE\WKHYLFWLPGLUHFWO\¶21 So the 
victim brought the proceedings against the accused. That said, the precursor to the 
                                                          
19
 Michel Foucault, µ$ERXWWKH&RQFHSWRIWKH³'DQJHURXV,QGLYLGXDO´ in 19th Century Legal Psychiatry¶ 
(1978) 1 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1 (Alain Baudot and Jane Couchman tr) 2. 
20
 Duff, Farmer and Marshall (n 2) 22-25. 
21
 Paul Gewirtz, µ9LFWLPVDQG9R\HXUVDWWKH&ULPLQDO7ULDO¶(1996) 90(3) N.W.U.L.R. 863, 865. 
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role of prosecutor was in fact a function originally carried out by jurors following trial 
E\MXU\EHLQJHVWDEOLVKHGLQ(QJOLVKFULPLQDOWULDOVµDVWKH&URZQJUDGXDOO\DVVXPHG
the power to punish those who broke the .LQJ¶VSHDFH¶22 8QOLNHWRGD\¶VSURFHHGLQJV
juries were self-LQIRUPLQJ UHTXLULQJ µQR RXWVLGH RIILFHU WR LQYHVWLJDWH FULPH DQG WR
LQIRUPWKHMXURUVRIWKHHYLGHQFH¶ 23 so the jury had an investigative function as well as 
a judicial one, basing their decisions on local knowledge and the standing of the 
accused. Gradually the investigative role of the jury lessened as evidence of the 
alleged offences was required to be presented at court by the parties. Between the 
15th and 18th centuries the criminal trial mRYHGIURPDQLQTXLU\WRDQDOWHUFDWLRQDVµWKH
SURVHFXWLRQ RI FULPH ZDV EHFRPLQJ PRUH RUJDQLVHG DQG V\VWHPDWLF¶24 During this 
period trials focused on an altercation between the victim and the defendant with brief 
oral hearings requiring both parties to spHDN7KHYLFWLP¶VUROHZDVSLYRWDOLQQDWXUHDV
D µFLWL]HQ SURVHFXWRU¶25 combining the functions of witness and prosecutor. The 
defendant was not afforded any of the basic protections typical in a liberal trial, such 
as advance notice of the charges they faced or any legal representation.26 Thus the 
trial process was very remote from the liberal problematics of state and deprivation of 
liberty that permeate the current trial legitimation under consideration in this thesis. 
The progression of the criminal trial from altercation to the more recognisable 
adversarial trial during the 18th century, marked the start of the regression of the role 
of the victim and the rise in prominence of the defendant. Although victims initially 
continued to prosecute many cases, where there was no victim or their evidence was 
LQVXIILFLHQW MXVWLFHV RI WKH SHDFH EHFDPH µEDFN-XS SURVHFXWRUV¶27 Following the 
passing of the Treason Trials Act 1696, which permitted legal representation for those 
accused of treason, there was a subtle shift towards a recognition that those faced 
ZLWKPRXQWLQJDGHIHQFHDJDLQVW WKHPLJKWRI WKHVWDWH¶VUHVRXUFHVPD\QHHGOHJDO
assistance.28 Although formally prohibited in all other matters, the 18th century saw the 
use of defence lawyers gradually increase in the trial, and with this rise came the 
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advent of more effective cross-examination of witnesses and the development of 
exclusionary rules of evidence relating to hearsay, character and confessions which 
VWLOO RSHUDWH LQ WRGD\¶V OLEHUDO WULDO SURFHVV$Gditional protections for the defendant 
FDPH LQ WKH SDVVLQJ RI WKH 3ULVRQHUV¶ &RXQVHO $FW  ZKLFK SHUPLWWHG GHIHQFH
lawyers to make opening and closing speeches to the jury. Although 18th century trials 
were still brought by victims as private individualV WKH VWDWH¶V LQYROYHPHQW JUHZ
through for example offering financial incentives to prosecute. These developments 
combined to turn the proceedings into a more recognisable adversarial arena, with the 
judge adopting a neutral role as arbiter rather than investigator. This redistribution of 
roles resulted in the trial moving away from a conflict between victim and accused 
WRZDUGV D µFRQWHVW EHWZHHQ WZR FDVHV ZLWK GHIHQFH FRXQVHO LQVLVWLQJ WKDW WKH
prosecution prove (rather than assert) its case through the presentation of evidence, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH QHZO\ IRUPXODWHG VWDQGDUG RI EH\RQG UHDVRQDEOH GRXEW¶29 This 
resonates with another liberal value identified by Duff relating to the notion that criminal 
punishment should only be inflicted upon those found to be guilty of criminal conduct, 
which introduces the notions of proof, fairness and proportionality. Importantly, this is 
a turning point for the role of the victim as prosecutions start to be taken out of their 
hands and into the remit of the state. In chapter two I detail more fully this important 
step towards the present day position in which the victim plays a limited role at best in 
the decision whether to prosecute a defendant and the direction of the case at trial.  
The criminal trial moving into the 20th century saw a far greater emphasis on 
WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V SRVLWLRQ ZLWK WKH UROH RI WKH YLFWLP UHWUHDWLQJ IXUWKHU LQWR WKH
EDFNJURXQG$V*HZLUW]SXWV LW µWKHYLFWLPEHFDPHD WULJJHUDQGDZLWQHVV IRU WKH
prosecution, rather than the prosecution's director.¶30 The trial became 
µUHFRQVWUXFWLYH¶31 in nature due to its lengthening hearings aimed at reconstructing past 
events to test the guilt of the accused. This foregrounds another prominent liberal 
justification identified by Duff which is the requirement to establish the factual truth 
about whether the defendant committed the offence charged against him. As the police 
took over the prosecution of cases from private individuals, so the number of witnesses 
called to give evidence increased, including evidence of the police investigation, 
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forensic experts and the accused themselves under the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. 
Overall, it was the role of the lawyers that dominated this period, bringing a new level 
of professionalism to the arena and further displacing the role of the victim to the 
background. The latter part of the 20th century has seen the concept of due process 
heavily influence the criminal trial, with the state on the one hand aiming to establish 
WKHJXLOWRIWKHDFFXVHG\HWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGµOLPLW>LQJ] itself in the means that may be 
XVHGIRUWKLVSURFHVV¶32 This fits with another liberal value identified by Duff relating to 
GXHSURFHVVLPSHUDWLYHVDVDZD\WRSURWHFWµFLWL]HQVDJDLQVWWKHSRWHQWLDOO\DQGDOO
too often actually) oppressive power of thHVWDWH¶33 A number of defendant-centric 
measures aimed at protecting the defendant to ensure a fair trial were enacted in this 
period such as protections provided during the investigative process under the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and increased disclosure of prosecution evidence. 
Additionally, the role of the judge moved towards an increasingly managerial one to 
ensure that the trial process was efficient. The establishment of the Crown Prosecution 
Service to conduct the prosecution of the case against the accused in criminal trials 
rather than the police executing that role in addition to carrying out the investigation is 
considered in chapter two. All of which results in the emphasis of the proceedings 
being focused on the defendant, with the fairness of the proceedings being pivotal to 
justify the deprivation of liberty. 
 In addition to the liberal values embedded in the criminal trial already 
considered above, Duff identified some other liberal features outside of the trial such 
as that conduct should be criminalised only if it is morally wrong, although this is 
qualified to take into account the fact that some kinds of immorality should not be 
criminalised and some criminality contains no immorality such as regulatory 
offences.34 Additionally some separation of powers is required so that the legislature 
make law and the courts apply it, bearing in mind however the distinctive features of 
common law systems which allow for judge made law where the legislature are silent. 
These features, combined with those considered above, form a liberal set of values 
that underpin the criminal trial process and help to contextualise the centrality of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VSODFHZLWKLQWKHV\VWHP 
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2. A recent turn to the victim 
In this part of the chapter I will be considering the recent shift in focus towards the 
victim by detailing some of the victim-centric reforms over the past couple of decades. 
In the following part of the chapter I shall explain why these reforms sit more squarely 
in neoliberal paradigms of governance. The victim-centric reforms are not, however, 
the only changes to have occurred in criminal proceedings in recent times. Indeed, a 
common theme can be seen as emerging in more recent academic writing concerning 
attacks on the liberal justifications for the trial in general. Ashworth and Zedner suggest 
WKDWµVRPHORQJVWDQGLQJDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHUROHDQGWKHSODFHRIWKHFULPLQDOWULDO
DQGLWIROORZVWKHFULPLQDOODZDUHXQGHUFKDOOHQJH¶35 In analysing the threat to these 
values they explore a number of reforms deviating from this paradigm of the criminal 
trial, such as diversions away from court limiting the number of cases that can reach 
trial, the increased use of fixed penalties and preventive orders,36 and the downgrading 
of proceedings through the greater use of summary trial and incentives to plead 
guilty.37 They consider the changing role of the state and in particular the manifestation 
of the over-development of the regulatory state as one way of understanding these 
reforms and conclude that any attempt to undermine the liberal model of the criminal 
trial must be resisted.38 
The significance of the recent challenges to this paradigm has an impact on the 
legitimacy of the criminal trial, as averred by Ashworth and Zedner where they suggest 
WKDW WKHUH LV µJURZLQJ VFHSWLFLVP DERXW WKH ILWQHVV RI WKH FULPLQDO WULDO WR IXOILO LWV
SXUSRVHV¶39 They attribute this to five main challenges levelled at the present trial 
system in that it is not cost-effective, preventive, necessary, appropriate or effective.40 
These challenges sit squarely within the neoliberal paradigm of governance according 
to market metrics. It is in this climate of scepticism that the phenomenon of a recent 
turn towards the victLP¶VSODFHLQWKHSURFHVVHPHUJHVZKLFK,DUJXHFRPHVIURPWKH
same neoliberal imperative.  
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Beginning, as I have established, from a position of marginalisation in the 
criminal trial process, the role and rights of the victim have been dramatically 
accentuated over the past three decades, both domestically and internationally, 
OHDGLQJ 0DWWKHZ +DOO WR DVVHUW WKDW µRYHU WKH ODVW  \HDUV YLFWLPV RI FULPH KDYH
XQGHUJRQHD UDGLFDOPHWDPRUSKRVLV IURP WKH ³IRUJRWWHQPDQRI WKHFULPLQDO MXVWLFH
V\VWHP´ WR WKH VXEMHFWV RI H[WHQVLYH RIILFLDO DWWHQWLRQ DQG OHJLVODWLYH FKDQJH¶41 
Domestically, against the history and conceptually settled liberal basis of the criminal 
trial which emphasised the interests of and in the defendant, a sudden raft of what I 
consider to be neoliberal reforms appearing to privilege the victim were enacted, 
particularly between 1997 and 2015. The government rhetoric surrounding these 
UHIRUPVFRQVLVWHQWO\UHIHUUHGWRDWDUJHWRISXWWLQJYLFWLPV³DWWKHKHDUW´RIWKHFULPLQDO
justice system.42 In a manner fitting this chapter as an introduction, I summarise a 
number of these victim-centric measures below, returning to focus on two such 
measures in detail in chapters two and three as indicative of the broader trend towards 
increasing the role of the victim in criminal proceedings. 
A turn to the victim is evidenced in a large spectrum of initiatives spanning both 
services available to the victim outside of the trial arena and during the trial itself, 
including the creation of representatives of victims¶ ULJKWV RQ WKH QDWLRQDO VWDJH
technological tools for victims, and measures designed to ease the burden of giving 
evidence at court, as introduced above. Initiatives aimed at the provision of services 
for the victim during their involvement with the criminal justice system included the 
creation of an increasing number of representatives championing the rights of victims. 
7ZRSRVWVZHUHFUHDWHGE\WKH1HZ/DERXUJRYHUQPHQWILUVWO\WKH9LFWLPV¶&KDPSLRQ
LQDQGWKHQVHFRQGO\LWVVXFFHVVRUWKH9LFWLPV¶ Commissioner.43 The Coalition 
government continued the trend by appointing a succession of ministerial roles 
IRFXVLQJRQWKHYLFWLPDORQJZLWK3ROLFHDQG&ULPH&RPPLVVLRQHUV³3&&V´IRUHDFK
police force with full responsibility for funding local victim services. It is illuminating to 
consider the relative financial investment in victims by this means: the total funding 
available for supporting victims in 2015/16 was £89.7 million. Of this, PCCs received 
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£63.15 million which included £1.35 million to support victims of sexual violence and 
domestic violence.44 Just over 70 percent of the budget for supporting victims, 
therefore, was allocated to PCCs which was a large proportion of the available funding 
and indicative of the increasing emphasis on victims by allocating resources to 
dedicated professionals.  
Additionally a number of technological advances were made to ease access to 
information for victims of crime. In 2014 the Ministry of Justice set out their 
commitments to victims45 which included the establishment of a new nationwide 
9LFWLPV¶,QIRUPDWLRQ6HUYLFH46 providing a website with information and advice about 
what support was available to victims, and how to access it accompanied by a 
telephone line run by the charity Victim Support. Another innovation concerning 
access to information was the TrackMyCrime online facility, rolled out to all police 
forces from January 2015. This service enabled those who had reported crimes to 
follow the investigation online and make contact with the investigating officer.  
Within the trial itself, a number of reforms concerning measures designed to 
assist non-defendants in giving evidence to the court were created. The Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 overhauled the notion of special measures directions 
in cases of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, referring to witnesses who are under 
18 at time of hearing, or those for whom the quality of evidence given was likely to be 
diminished by reason of incapacity or fear or distress at the prospect of testifying.47 
Amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the measures included the use of 
screens when giving evidence, the giving of evidence by live link, the use of video 
recorded evidence-in-chief and the use of video recorded cross-examination or re-
examination.48 
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Another discrete aspect of the trial under reform concerned what questions 
could be asked of non-defendants whilst giving their evidence. In R v Edwards49 the 
Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge, in relation to cross examination 
of a vulnerable witness, to stop the defence advocate putting the defence case to the 
prosecution witness or challenging them about what they had said. The Criminal 
Practice Directions 201550 made specific reference to this case51 and stated that it 
may be necessary to depart radically from traditional cross-examination to enable a 
witness to give the best evidence they can.52 Ground Rules Hearings to plan the 
questioning of a vulnerable witness in advance of a trial are now a requirement when 
using an intermediary but the Practice Direction stated that they were also good 
practice in other cases involving young witnesses or witnesses with communication 
needs.53 
The rules concerning the use of hearsay evidence at trial were also reformed 
LQ WKH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH$FW LPSDFWLQJRQ WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIKDYLQJDZLWQHVV¶V
statement read out to the court in their absence. The admissibility of unavailable 
witness evidence is dealt with in section 116 of the Act including where the witness 
does not give evidence through fear.54 Additionally, for the first time an explicit power 
is included to admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay if the Judge is satisfied that it is in 
the interests of justice to do so.55 ,QFRPSDWLELOLW\LVVXHVZLWKWKHULJKWWRµH[DPLQHRU
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination 
RIZLWQHVVHV¶56 resulted in the English courts ruling the legislation compatible57 whilst 
the EuURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV³(&W+5´LQLWLDOO\UXOHGLWLQFRPSDWLEOH58 when 
convictions were based on sole and decisive hearsay evidence.59 Despite Lord Justice 
3LWFKIRUGVWDWLQJWKDWµ,WQHHGVWREHDWWKHIRUHIURQWRIWKHFRXUW
VPLQGWKDWWKHULJKWWR
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GHIHQGDQW LWPXVWEHRQO\XSRQDFRPSHQVDWRU\JXDUDQWHHRI IDLUQHVV¶60 that case 
resulted in a conviction based almost entirely on the hearsay statement from a gang-
member who had lied to implicate others on previous occasions. 
Possibly the most publicised measure favouring the victim has been the Code 
RI3UDFWLFHIRU9LFWLPVRI&ULPH³WKH&RGH´.61 I consider the Code in further detail in 
chapter three but since its inFHSWLRQLQLWKDVEHHQSURPRWHGDVµSXWWLQJYLFWLPV
ILUVW¶62 by detailing key entitlements of victims such as being kept informed throughout 
the proceedings. The Code, along with all of the reforms detailed in the previous 
paragraphs, show a concerted move towards privileging the victim in criminal 
proceedings.  
To handle this breadth of reform in this thesis, and as earlier eluded to, I shall 
be concentrating on two victim-centric reforms in the following two chapters which 
typify the underlying motivations and impact of the reforms. The first reform concerns 
WKHLQFUHDVHGLQYROYHPHQWRIWKHYLFWLPLQWKHGHFLVLRQWRSURVHFXWHXQGHUWKH9LFWLP¶V
5LJKW WR 5HYLHZ 6FKHPH ³9556´ ZKLFK LPSDFWHG XSRQ WKH SUHYLRXV SUDFWLFH RI
allowing the CPS to decide alone whether to prosecute. The second concerns the 
9LFWLP3HUVRQDO6WDWHPHQW³936´VFKHPHZKLFKHQDEOHVYLFWLPVWRZULWHDERXWKRZ
criminal conduct has affected them and read out their VPS in court during sentencing 
if they so wish, marking a change from the previous sentencing exercise, which had 
focused on the mitigation presented on behalf of the defendant. These are two 
important measures amid the multitude of reforms privileging victims in recent years. 
Looking at them in more detail enables both ends of the criminal trial process, being 
the decision whether to prosecute and then the sentencing of the defendant, both of 
which having previously been remote to the victim, to be considered. This enables 
broader generalisations about this turn towards the victim to be made. 
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3. Why these reforms should be understood as neoliberal in nature 
This thesis considers recent victim-centric reforms to criminal proceedings in England 
and Wales as prima facie similarly heterogenous to the liberal account of the 
legitimacy of the criminal trial that Ashworth and Zedner deem to be under challenge, 
as considered above. Victim-centric reforms arguably arise from what have been 
WHUPHG³QHROLEHUDO´ ORJLFVRIJRYHUQDQFHDQG WKXV WKH\SUHVHQWDQH[DPSOHRI WKH
kind of challenge to the liberal institution of the trial which Ashworth and Zedner 
discredit, albeit with certain particularities which must be taken into account. The 
question to consider is how, if at all, does such a dramatic neoliberally motivated turn 
towards the victim impact on the legitimacy of the trial which is rooted in liberal 
justifications? To address this question, the answer to which on the face of it appears 
WR EH WKDW VXFK D WXUQ ZRXOG GHVWDELOLVH RU VKLIW WKH WULDO¶V OHJLWLPDF\ ± potentially 
dramatically - I am going to introduce the main justifications for considering the victim-
centric reforms as neoliberal in nature. In the following two chapters I shall then 
analyse two examples of the reforms considering what led to their creation, how they 
embody neoliberal imperatives and their impact on impact on the liberal trial institution. 
In the final chapter I analyse neoliberal and liberal paradigms of legitimacy to 
understand the impact of these reforms on the legitimacy of the criminal trial.  
As eluded to earlier, analogies can be drawn between the victim-centric reforms 
and the neoliberal paradigm of governing by market metrics. This can be seen in the 
drive to increase efficiencies in the criminal justice system and increased engagement 
ZLWK WKHXVHUVRI WKHV\VWHPWKURXJKVXUYH\VDQG µEUDQG¶UHFRJQLWLRQ Although the 
criminal trial itself is arguably not a market but a space away from it, the reforms fit 
with the neoliberal paradigm of the dissemination of the model of the market to all 
domains and its configuration of human beings as market actors. By encouraging more 
active victim participation, the reforms exhibit several typical neoliberal traits, such as 
the responsibilisation of the victim in the trial process, as opposed to the altogether 
different situation in which the trial resoundingly responsibilises the defendant. For 
some time a move towards responsibilisation from the state to public and private 
agents has been charted in the arena of crime prevention. David Garland considered 
the identification of those who can reduce criminal opportunities and the techniques of 
persuasion used to target the public as a whole, raising public consciousness, 
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interpolating the citizen as a potential victim and creating a sense of duty.63 These 
reforms arguably extend this movement from crime prevention to the prosecution of 
offences. This is exemplified by the many reforms, considered above, which ultimately 
aim to ensure the victim participates in the trial process, in turn resulting in more viable 
prosecutions, such as the measures aimed at easing the experience of giving 
evidence in court including the special measures directions and the restrictions on 
aspects of cross-examination.  
A second neoliberal trait evidenced concerns individualisation. Michel Foucault 
FRQVLGHUHGKRZ LQDGLVFLSOLQDU\UHJLPHWKHµD[LVRI LQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ¶64 shifts away 
from the powerful figureheads to those on whom power is exercised, such as the 
criminal. These reforms illustrate movement again but towards the victim of crime 
instead. Garland previously noted that: 
In contemporary penality this situation has been reversed. The processes of 
individualisation now increasingly centre upon the victim. Individual victims are to be 
kept informed, to be involved in the judicial process from complaint through to 
conviction and beyond.65  
The technological advances enabling victims to access assistance and be kept 
LQIRUPHG DV WR WKH SURJUHVV RI WKHLU FRPSODLQWV LGHQWLILHG DERYH VXFK DV 9LFWLPV¶
Information Service website and the TrackMyCrime online facility exemplify this 
process of individualisation.  
A third quality evidenced in these reforms that reflects neoliberal paradigms 
concerns personalisation. The language used in the reforms certainly presents as an 
appeal to citizenship, by promoting the duty on victims to engage with the criminal 
justice system whilst importing consumerist ideals such as enhanced services and 
entitlements. The Code, as earlier mentioned, is an archetypal example of 
SHUVRQDOLVDWLRQLQWKDWLWVHWVRXWµVHUYLFHVWKDWPXVWEHSURYLGHGWRYLFWLPVRIFULPH¶66 
including enhanced entitlements for victims of the most serious crimes, subject to the 
making of an allegation of a criminal offence to the police. Even the terminology used 
ZKHQ UHIHUULQJ WR WKHFRPSODLQDQWDV µYLFWLP¶ LQ WKH UHIRUPV ZKLFK , KDYH VLPLODUO\
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adopted in this thesis, appeals to the individual making the complaint, whilst in fact 
tending to prejudge the situation. The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime is in itself 
a misnomer given the possibility of the making of a false allegation, which can lead to 
criminal charges against the RULJLQDOµYLFWLP¶67 Similarly, the terminology used in the 
9LFWLP¶V5LJKWWR5HYLHZ6FKHPHWREHFRQVLGHUHGLQGHWDLOLQWKHIROORZLQJFKDSWHU
alludes to the complainant as the victim, which is arguably a more appealing, emotive 
title.  
A further typical neoliberal trait underlying all of the reforms is the drive to 
reduce the risks posed by criminals to an increasingly consumer-driven society, 
GHWDLOHG LQ FKDSWHU IRXU ZKHQ ORRNLQJ DW WKH QHROLEHUDO VWDWH¶V WHFKQLTXH RI
OHJLWLPLVDWLRQE\JRYHUQLQJ µWKURXJh a criminal-FRQVXPHUGRXEOH¶68 By engaging the 
victim with the criminal justice system, the state has a better chance of securing 
convictions and enforcing a zero-tolerance to criminality.69 All of these neoliberal 
paradigms are further considered when analysing the two examples of victim-centric 
reforms in chapters two and three. 
If the motivation for these victim-centric reforms is based in neoliberal 
rationality, and therefore heterogenous to the liberal, well might we ask whether they 
disrupt the liberal conception of the trial and its legitimacy? Wendy Brown criticises the 
rise of neoliberal imperatives through her assertion that the liberal institution is being 
HURGHG VLQFH µJRYHUQDQFH DFFRUGLQJ WR PDUNHW PHWULFV GLVSODFHV FODVVLF OLEHUDO
democratic coQFHUQVZLWK MXVWLFHDQGEDODQFLQJGLYHUVH LQWHUHVWV¶70 For Brown, the 
liberal democratic social contract is turning inside out. Citizenship concerned with 
public things and common good is vanishing and liberal democratic justice concerns 
are receding.71 HowHYHU %URZQ¶V DQDO\VLV DSSHDUV PDUNHGO\ LQDSSURSULDWH WR WKH
µOLEHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQ¶DVPDQLIHVWHGLQWKHFULPLQDOWULDO,QGHHG%URZQ¶VVWXG\GRHVQRW
engage with the trial at all²a highly particular institution, to be sure, but an important 
one if the conFHUQ LV ZLWK µOLEHUDO GHPRFUDWLF MXVWLFH¶ 7KH GLIILFXOW\ ZLWK DSSO\LQJ
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subject with the trial process in a complex way in order for the institution to function. 
There is a paradox here between the idea that human beings are being rendered as 
human capital, not just for themselves but also for the state, and the tendency of trials 
to valorise, protect and make central individual experience. As human capital, 
participants have no guarantee of security, protection or even survival. On the other 
hand, the reforms in issue here provide significant protections for individual human 
beings, in this case the victims of criminal conduct. The idea that the subject as human 
capital ³LVDWRQFHLQFKDUJHRILWVHOIUHVSRQVLEOHIRULWVHOI\HWDQLQVWUXPHQWDOL]DEOH
DQGSRWHQWLDOO\GLVSHQVDEOHHOHPHQWRIWKHZKROH´72 cannot be said to apply to victims 
in the criminal trial whose evidence is often indispensable for successful prosecutions. 
As we will see more clearly by way of my analysis of specific reforms in chapters two 
and three, I am showing how and why such reforms came about by focusing on what 
I perceive to be the neoliberal imperative of giving the victim a voice within the 
fundamentally liberal trial institution. And in the final chapter, I will argue that this 
imperative notwithstanding, such reform is ultimately best understood as 
strengthening the liberal character of the trial institution, rather than undermining it as 
%URZQ¶s much more general thesis would have it. What the reforms do, instead, is 
expand the audience of the trial proceedings to the victim at points that were previously 
remote to them and in so doing, act to promote a liberal concept of legitimacy based 
on its relational and dialogical character,73 resulting in the endurance of the liberal trial 
institution.  
 
4. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have introduced the issues that underpin the subject-matter of this 
thesis. The marginalised position of the victim in the criminal trial process, whose 
traditional focus has been on the defendant, has been established. In tracing the rise 
in prominence of the defendant and the demise in importance of the victim, the settled 
conception of the English criminal trial as a liberal institution has been highlighted. It 
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is the liberal justifications of the participation of the defendant being called to account 
and due process to protect the defendant against the oppressive exercise of state 
power that have legitimised the criminal trial process. 
 I have illustrated a recent, dramatic turn towards the role of the victim, with the 
stated aim of putting victims at the heart of the criminal justice system, by detailing a 
number of victim-centric reforms. It is my contention that these reforms should be 
understood as neoliberal in nature. I have detailed the neoliberal paradigms exhibited 
by these reforms including responsibilisation of the victim in the trial process and 
individualisation and personalisation of the proceedings, leading to the overall effect 
of engaging victims with the process, which increases the chances of securing 
convictions and thereby enforces a zero-tolerance to criminality.   
I now turn, in chapter two, to consider the first of two victim-centric reforms 
ZKLFKW\SLILHVWKHQHROLEHUDOLPSHUDWLYHVLQWURGXFHGLQWKLVFKDSWHU7KH9LFWLPV¶5LJKW
to Review Scheme illustrates the turn to the victim at an early stage in proceedings 





Chapter one introduced the notion of a turn to the victim in criminal trial proceedings, 
which had previously focused on the defendant. In this chapter, one of the more recent 
victim-centric reforms is examined in detail to understand the situation prior to the 
reform, what lead to the reform, how the reform occurred, the neoliberal paradigms it 
embodies and its impact on the liberal trial institution.  
The limited role undertaken by the victim in the decision whether to prosecute 
a suspect followed in the tradition of the constrained function of victims in English 
criminal proceedings. As described in the previous chapter, the focus of these 
proceedings has been on the adversarial dispute between the state and the 
defendant.1 The place of victims in the system generally has been the subject of 
increasing debate over the past decade or more, following a number of victim-centric 
UHIRUPVLPSDFWLQJXSRQYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVWKDWFDQEURDGO\EHGLYLGHGLQWRWZRFDWHJRULHV
VHUYLFH ULJKWV DLPHG DW IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH YLFWLPV¶ H[SHULHQFH LQ WKH V\VWHP DQG
procedural rights providing victims with a participatory role in the decision making 
process.2  
In this chapter I shall look at a reform which privileges the victim during the 
decision to prosecute the alleged perpetrator by providing a specific mechanism for a 
victim to challenge a decision not to prosecute the suspect. This reform illustrates 
vividly a situation where perceived fairness to the defendant is in direct tension with 
an increasing consideration of the victim. Originally a decision not to prosecute, once 
communicated to the suspect, could not be challenged, at least partially out of concern 
for fairness to the suspect.3 However, this finality has been gradually eroded to the 
SRLQWZKHUH WKH9LFWLPV¶5LJKW WR5HYLHZ6FKHPH³9556´ZDV ODXQFKHG LQ
enshrining a right of the victim to seek a review of the decision. In looking at this reform 
I am seeking to understand how it changes the procedural rights of victims to review 
prosecutorial decisions. It is my contention that the reform exhibits neoliberal 
characteristics and so I intend to consider both what neoliberal imperatives drove it, 
                                                          
1
 See for example Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer and Sandra Marshall, The Trial on Trial: Volume 3: 
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and the extent to which this reform impacts on the fundamentally liberal nature of 
criminal proceedings.  
First, I shall consider the status of a decision taken on behalf of the state not to 
prosecute prior to the launch of the VRRS. Such a decision started as a conclusive 
determination, favouring the rights of the accused. This evolved to a decision that 
could be reviewed, at the instigation of an aggrieved victim, through the Crown 
3URVHFXWLRQ6HUYLFH¶V³&36´JHQHUDOFRPSODLQWV¶SURFHGXUH,VKDOOWKHQDQDO\VHWKH
judgment in R v Killick,4 which triggered the creation of the VRRS. Lord Justice 
Thomas held that there must be a right for a victim to seek a review of a decision not 
to prosecute given that such a decision is a final one for a victim. He suggested that 
WKH 'LUHFWRU RI 3XEOLF 3URVHFXWLRQV ³'33´ UHYLHZHG WKH XVDJH RI WKH FRPSODLQWV
procedure as the correct forum to seek a review. I shall then consider the creation of 
WKH9556DQGDQDO\VHLWVHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHYLFWLP¶VULJKWWRUHYLHZ,ZLOO
conclude this part by considering whether the position of the victim has in fact 
changed.  
Second, I will look at the neoliberal imperatives embodied in the VRRS. The 
idea of individualisation of processes away from those with power towards the 
individual subject, in this case the victim, can be seen in the scheme. Similarly, 
responsibilisation of the individual, through empowerment, is a prominent feature. The 
importation of consumerist concepts and zero-tolerance towards criminality can also 
be found in the content and promotion of the scheme. These paradigms feature heavily 
in both the substance of the VRRS and also the official rhetoric marking the arrival and 
benefits of the VRRS. 
Third, I shall suggest that the VRRS does not encroach in any meaningful way 
on the liberal nature of the criminal trial. The fact that it in no way alters the 
dichotomous nature of the proceedings between the state and the defendant, failing 
to provide the victim with any increase to their level of participation in decision making, 
LV LOOXVWUDWLYHRI WKHVFKHPH¶V OLPLWHGDPELWThis question will be taken up again in 
chapter four where I shall consider what impact the scheme has on the liberal account 
of the legitimacy of the trial, instead of its liberal nature, by considering the 
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HQKDQFHPHQW RI WKH YLFWLP¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI SURFHGXUDO IDLUQess as a means of 
strengthening the legitimacy of the trial process. 
 
1. From an impossibility to a possibility by way of complaint 
, VWDUW E\ FRQVLGHULQJ ZKHWKHU DQG LI VR KRZ D YLFWLP FRXOG FKDOOHQJH WKH &36¶V
decision not to prosecute a suspect prior to the creation of the VRRS. 
As we saw in the introduction in the tradition of the English adversarial criminal 
trial the victim is viewed as having no direct interest in the bringing or eventual outcome 
of the proceedings. Rather it is the state on behalf of the sovereign who, in addition to 
providing a facility for determining resolutions for persons in dispute, is a party to that 
dispute by investigating complaints and then instigating and controlling the conduct of 
the case for one side of the persons in dispute, the prosecution.5 Nils Christie argued 
WKDWWKHUROHRIWKHVWDWHUHVXOWVLQWKHYLFWLPEHLQJµSXVKHGFRPSOHWHO\RXWRIWKHDUHQD
reduced to the trigger-RII RI WKH ZKROH WKLQJ¶6 In this section I shall illustrate the 
GRPLQDQFHRI WKHVXVSHFW¶V position in comparison to the place of the victim when 
UHFRQVLGHULQJDGHFLVLRQQRWWRSURVHFXWHSULRUWRWKH9556¶VLQWURGXFWLRQLQ, in 
SDUWLFXODU WKHVXVSHFW¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVKDYLQJEHHQ LQIRUPHG WKDW WKHUHZRXOGEHQR
prosecution. 
The conduct of a case following a complaint was initially, and continues to be, 
in the hands of the investigatory authorities, most commonly the police acting under 
the auspices of the Home Office. Prior to the introduction of the VRRS in 2013, if a 
suspect was identified, arrested and interviewed, the decision whether to prosecute 
the suspect was taken by the CPS,7 the independent principal prosecuting authority in 
England and Wales, in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors.8 Nothing 
has changed in this regard following the inception of the VRRS. After reviewing all 
available evidence the full code test required, and continues to do so post-2013, the 
prosecutor to apply a two stage test: (i) the evidential stage which considers the 
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8
 Issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s. 10. 
31 
 
sufficiency of the evidence, in that there must be sufficient evidence against each 
suspect on each proposed charge to provide a realistic prospect of conviction9 
followed by (ii) the public interest test which requires every prosecution to only be 
brought if it is required in the public interest.10 The victim played, and continues to play, 
no direct part in this process over and above possibly providing a witness statement 
forming part of the available evidence. The only exception to this is that there is a 
requirement that the circumstances of, and the harm caused to, the victim, including 
views expressed by the victim about the impact the offence has had on them, be 
considered under paragraph 4.12 of the Code. At the same time however, this 
provision is careful to explicitly emphasise that the CPS does not act for the victim. In 
other words, the decision to prosecute rested, and continues to rest, in the sole domain 
of the CPS acting independently of the victim or their potential considerations.  
Should the decision be taken by the CPS to charge the suspect (either pre or 
post-WKHFDVHSURFHHGVWRWKH0DJLVWUDWHV¶&RXUWDQGWKHQGHSHQGLQJRQWKH
seriousness of the offence possibly the Crown Court. HM Courts & Tribunals Service 
³+0&76´DQH[HFXWLYHDJHQF\VSRQVRUHGE\WKH0LQLVWU\Rf Justice, is responsible 
for the administration of the courts in England and Wales and the CPS remains in 
FRQWURORIWKHSURVHFXWLRQRIWKHFDVHDVLWSURJUHVVHVWKURXJKWKHFRXUWV$µQRWJXLOW\¶
plea will result in a trial and most likely the reappearance of the victim as a witness, 
HLWKHUZLOOLQJO\RUKDYLQJEHHQFRPSHOOHGWRDWWHQG$µJXLOW\SOHD¶RUILQGLQJRIJXLOWE\
the tribunal of fact will trigger the sentencing of the defendant by the tribunal of law. 
The role of the victim at the sentencing stage is considered in chapter three below.  
Prior to the inception of the CPS on 1st April 198611 the policy concerning 
SRWHQWLDOUHYLHZVRIGHFLVLRQVQRWWRSURVHFXWHVHWE\WKH'33IDYRXUHGWKHVXVSHFW¶V
position and took no account of the victim. Once a suspect had been informed of a 
GHFLVLRQQRWWRSURVHFXWHµWKDWGHFLVLRQVKRXOGQRWUHPDLQRSHQ for reappraisal and 
SRVVLEOHUHYHUVDOKRZHYHUORQJDSHULRGPD\HODSVH¶12 Within three weeks of the CPS 
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taking responsibility for prosecutions this absolute finality of a terminatory decision 
was modified. In April 1986 the then Solicitor-General Sir Patrick Mayhew announced 
in a House of Commons debate concerning prosecution policy that although the DPP 
had originally taken the view that once a decision not to prosecute had been 
communicated to the suspect that decision should be final, he had decided to revise 
WKLVVWDQFH WR WDNH LQWRDFFRXQW µWKHYHU\ UDUHFDVHVZKHUH WKHUH LVVWLOODSUDFWLFDO
SRVVLELOLW\WKDWIXUWKHUIDFWVVXIILFLHQWWRLQFULPLQDWHWKHVXVSHFWPD\EHXQFRYHUHG¶13 
following a review undertaken only in exceptional circumstances. It was further 
explained that any decision to reappraise the decision to prosecute could only be taken 
with the express authority of the DPP or Deputy DPP. In other words, such a course 
of action required the highest authorisation. At the inception of the CPS it was therefore 
quite clear that the victim played no active role in the decision making process for 
instigating proceedings and the victim could not trigger any review of a decision not to 
prosecute since reviews were reserved for the rare occurrence of fresh incriminatory 
evidence. Fairness to the suspect, who has been informed that he or she will not face 
prosecution, was the explicit paramount consideration at this time. 
 The issue was not raised again in the House of Commons until seven years 
later, when in March 1993, prompted by the role of Deputy DPP being effectively 
abolished, the Attorney-General stated that the policy of the DPP was not to revisit the 
decision not to prosecute save for in special circumstances, unless the initial decision 
was taken due to evidential insufficiency.14 He partially clarified what special 
circumstances might justify the reconsideration of an earlier decision by providing two 
VDPSOHVLWXDWLRQV7KHILUVWFRQFHUQHGZKDWKHFDOOHGµUDUHFDVHV¶ZKHUHWKHRULJLQDO
decision was subsequently found to have not been justified. The second concerned 
cases where it had already been communicated to the defendant that necessary 
evidence was likely to become available in the near future that needed to be collected 
and reviewed, which could lead to proceedings being re-instituted.15 Neither scenario 
H[SOLFLWO\PDGHUHIHUHQFHWRWKHYLFWLP¶VZLVKHVDOWKRXJKWKHILUVWPDGHUHIHUHQFHWR
the need to maintain confidence in the criminal justice system.16 Arguably it is more 
specifically the victim¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWKHV\VWHPWKDWLVEHLQJLPSOLFLWO\LGHQWLILHGKHUH
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as the justification for revisiting a decision, since it is the victim who would initially have 
been aggrieved by the terminatory decision and whose confidence would have been 
lost, particularly given the suggestion that such cases would be rare. Similarly it is 
surely the impact of the decision on the victim being the basis for the unjust nature of 
the original decision since the original decision not to prosecute would have caused 
injustice to the victim of that case? However, neither of these scenarios necessarily 
triggered or justified a review. It is my contention that such considerations, particularly 
matters of confidence in the system, are highly relevant to the eventual reform of the 
mechanism for seeking a review of decisions not to prosecute and I shall consider this 
in the last part of this chapter when I consider the lack of impact the reform had on the 
liberal nature of proceedings and again in chapter four when considering the legitimacy 
of the trial.  
Whilst providing this partial clarification of when a terminatory decision could be 
revisited, the level of authority for taking the decision to review an earlier decision was 
also changed. The Attorney-General explained that from 1 April 1993 the decision to 
review an earlier decision could be taken by a chief crown prosecutor, as opposed to 
the DPP. This is of note since it is a considerable reduction in the level of authority 
required to take a decision, which is perhaps indicative of a shift in direction towards 
increased future reviews.  
The circumstances for when a decision not to prosecute could be reviewed, as 
detailed above, where limited. In addition, the process for a victim to pursue such a 
review was arbitrary. There was no specific procedure for a victim to follow, should 
they seek to instigate a review of a decision adverse to their position. If a victim was 
dissatisfied at a decision not to charge, to discontinue or otherwise terminate all 
proceedings, the CPS handled any request to review the decision as a complaint 
WKURXJKWKHJHQHUDO&36FRPSODLQW¶VSURFHGXUHUDWKHUWKDQDVDGLVWLQFWUHTXHVWWR
UHYLHZDGHFLVLRQ7KLVLQYROYHGDWKUHHWLHUSURFHVVIRUFRPSODLQWVGHILQHGDVµDQ\
expression of dissatisfaction about any aspect of service provided by the Crown 
3URVHFXWLRQ 6HUYLFH¶17 The only specific provision relating to review requests of 
decisions not to prosecute in the CPS process manual focussed on expediting such 
requests through the complaints procedure where the alleged offence was subject to 
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a prosecutorial time-limit with internal CPS guidance advocating that decisions should 
be re-reviewed if likely to be the subject of judicial review. Clearly this was a 
cumbersome process more suited to complaints concerning the level of service 
received rather than substantive procedural matters such as the decision not to 
prosecute.  
The only other option open to an aggrieved victim, other than mounting a private 
prosecution, would have been to seek judicial review of the prosecutorial decision. 
However, judicial review presents victims with two major difficulties. In hearing a 
challenge, the High Court would consider only the lawfulness of the decision-making 
process resulting in the decision not to prosecute, as opposed to the merits of that 
decision itself. Furthermore, it has been suggested that an aggrieved victim seeking 
to challenge a decision not to prosecute would have faced significant obstacles, given 
WKDW FRXUWV KDG µH[SUHVVHG UHOXFWDQFH WR LQWHUIHUH ZLWK SURVecutorial discretion, 
HPSKDVLVLQJWKDWWKHLUSRZHUWRUHYLHZGHFLVLRQVLVWREHXVHGVSDULQJO\¶18 That said, 
the courts did recognise that this process was the only effective way of achieving some 
accountability for decisions taken not to prosecute so for example Lord Chief Justice 
Bingham asserted that µWKHVWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZPXVWQRWEHVHWWRRKLJKVLQFHMXGLFLDO
review is the only means by which the citizen can seek redress against a decision not 
to prosecute and if the test were too exacting an effectLYHUHPHG\ZRXOGEHGHQLHG¶19 
,WKDVEHHQQRWHGKRZHYHU WKDWGHVSLWHDZLOOLQJQHVVRQWKHFRXUWV¶SDUW WRUHYLHZ
decisions, victims faced other problems which limited the availability and effectiveness 
of this course of action such as difficulties in obtaining the reasons for the decisions 
not to prosecute which were required to mount a judicial challenge but not required to 
be given by the CPS and the vagueness of the public interest limb of the test to 
prosecute which hindered successful challenge.20 Notwithstanding its availability as a 
possible mechanism for reviewing decisions not to prosecute, judicial review has been 
GHVFULEHGDVµDKLJKO\H[FHSWLRQDOUHPHG\¶21 leaving the victim with very few effective 
options to challenge a decision taken not to prosecute a case affecting them. It would 
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seem likely that for most aggrieved victims, their only recourse would have been to try 
to seek a review through the inappropriate forum of the CPS complaints process by 
way of complaint.  
I move on to consider what cKDQJHGFRQFHUQLQJWKHYLFWLP¶VDELOLW\WRVHHND
review of a decision not to prosecute following a very important obiter dicta comment 
in the case of R v Christopher Killick.22 
 
2. Moving away from complaints towards a right to seek a review of a decision 
Seeking a review of a decision not to prosecute has now been taken out of the CPS 
general complaints process and a new, specific scheme has been created to handle 
such requests. The VRRS was launched by the CPS in June 2013 following a 2011 
decision of the Court of Appeal concerning how a victim can seek a review of such a 
decision. In R v Christopher Killick ³Killick´DFDVHFRQFHUQLQJ IDLOLQJV LQ WKHSUH-
existing complaints procedure, the court specifically gave legal effect to a victim's right 
to seek a review of a decision not to prosecute.23 In his judgment Lord Justice Thomas 
KHOGWKDWµDVDGHFLVLRQQRWWRSURVHFXWHLVLQUHDOLW\DILQDOGHFLVLRQIRUDYLFWLPWKHUH
PXVWEHDULJKWWRVHHNDUHYLHZRIVXFKDGHFLVLRQ¶24 This links back to my contentions 
that the special circumstances for reviewing a terminatory decision, particularly in 
relation to the maintenance of confidence in the system, implicitly referred to the victim, 
since they were directly affected by the decision not to prosecute. 
 7KLV UHFRJQLWLRQRI D ULJKW RQ WKHYLFWLP¶VSDUW WR VHHND UHYLHZ ZDVDFOHDU
departure from the pre-existing ethos, exemplified by the CPS handling such a request 
under their general complaints procedure, with no specific procedure or guidance 
relating to this scenario. By articulating the request to review a decision as a right on 
the part of the victim, not just a mere possibility, the position of the victim as having no 
interest in the reconsideration of a decision, as considered at the start of this chapter, 
was changed dramatically.  
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This right is essentially akin to the right contained in a draft European Union 
³(8´ 'LUHFWLYH RQ HVWDEOLVKLQJ PLQLPXP VWDQGDUGV RQ WKH ULJKWV VXSSRUW DQG
SURWHFWLRQRIYLFWLPVRIFULPH³WKHGLUHFWLYH´- published just one month before the 
judgment in Killick was delivered - ZKLFKSURYLGHGWKDW³0HPEHU6WDWHVVKDOOHQVXUH
WKDW YLFWLPV KDYH WKH ULJKW WR KDYH DQ\ GHFLVLRQ QRW WRSURVHFXWH UHYLHZHG´25 The 
directive entered into force the following year with this provision moved to Article 11.26  
I shall first consider what was said concerning how victims could seek a review 
of a terminatory prosecutorial decision in Killick. I shall then explore how the CPS 
responded to the judgment before consideriQJLQPRUHGHWDLOKRZWKHYLFWLP¶VSRVLWLRQ
has changed under the new scheme.  
 
i. The gauntlet is thrown down in R v Killick 
The appeal in Killick arose from an unsuccessful application to stay a prosecution for 
sexual offences as an abuse of process. Complaints were made against the appellant 
by two complainants in February 2006, with his arrest and interview being conducted 
in April 2006. A decision not to prosecute was made over a year later in June 2007. 
One of the complainants lodged a complaint which instigated a review culminating in 
a decision to prosecute over two years later in December 2009, the appellant having 
previously been told he would not be prosecuted in June 2007. 27  
The initial decision not to prosecute had been taken by a Borough Crown 
Prosecutor and twice reviewed internally, first by a District Crown Prosecutor and then 
by a Sector Director before it was communicated to the appellant. Upon receipt of the 
complaint by the complainants of this decision, the CPS conducted a fresh review of 
the case by one of the CPS Special Casework Lawyers. During this review an 
LQGHSHQGHQW4XHHQ¶V&RXQVHO³4&´DGYLVHGWKDWWKHLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQQRWWRSURVHFXWH
was wholly reasonable. The complainants initiated the pre-action protocol which is a 
requirement prior to, and indicative of an intention towards, issuing proceedings for 
                                                          
25 Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 May 2011 establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, Art 10. 
26 Council Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime [2012] OJ L 315/57. 
27
 Killick (n 4) [21]. 
37 
 
judicial review; at which stage the CPS instigated a further review of the decision 
conducted by the Principal Legal Adviser to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who 
concluded that the appellant should be charged.28 
The appellant was convicted at trial having made an unsuccessful application 
to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process.29 At the appeal it was represented 
that the proceedings should be stayed because the appellant had been unequivocally 
informed that he would not be prosecuted, and a fair trial was no longer possible due 
to the delays in the proceedings. The appeal court determined that the communication 
with the appellant did not amount to a representation that there would be no 
prosecution, bearing in mind that his legal representation would have been aware of 
the rights of the complainants to seek a review by complaint. Delays were found to 
feature in these proceedings but they were not held to be sufficient to amount to an 
abuse of process.30  
In dismissing the appeal, Lord Justice Thomas considered that complainants 
have a right to have a decision reviewed and that having to make a complaint about a 
service by the CPS was an inappropriate forum for seeking such a review. In actuality, 
KH VXJJHVWHG WKH FRQQRWDWLRQV DWWDFKHG WR WKH WHUP ³FRPSODLQW´ FRXOG HYRNH
understandable concerns that prosecutors are placed under undue influence as 
opposed to the making of a request for a review.31 He observed in his dicta remarks 
WKDWµLWPXVWEHIRUWKH'LUHFWRU>RI3XEOLF3URVHFXWLRQV@WRFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUWKHZD\LQ
which the right of a victim to seek a review cannot be made the subject of a clearer 
SURFHGXUHDQGJXLGDQFHZLWKWLPHOLPLWV¶32 His stance in relation to the right of a victim 
WRVHHNDUHYLHZRIDILQDOGHFLVLRQQRWWRSURVHFXWHKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµHPSKDWLF¶33 
DQGLWKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDWLVKDVµEROVWHUHGYLFWLPV¶ULJKWV¶34 by recognising that 
there must be a right to review, rather than simply an administrative process to make 
a complaint as to the level of service received which may in turn lead to a review. This 
approach elevates the review above the typical review of decision-making process that 
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applies in most places in government to something to do with victimhood specifically. 
I shall be revisiting this notion in chapter four. 
It took the DPP some time to respond to the dicta in Killick. Indeed additional 
guidance was provided as to when decisions should be reconsidered shortly after the 
judgment and one week after the Directive entered into force, without any mention of 
the mechanism for instigating the review on the part of the Complainant. The then 
Attorney-General Mr Dominic Grieve made a written statement to the House of 
Commons announcing the publication of revised guidance by the CPS to prosecutors 
on the circumstances in which a decision not to prosecute or to terminate proceedings 
might be reconsidered and the procedure to be followed.35 The revision attached two 
more grounds to the existing two grounds for reconsidering a decision detailed 
above.36 The additional grounds arose out of earlier actions by the police so firstly 
ZKHUHSURFHHGLQJVDWWKH0DJLVWUDWHV¶&RXUWZHUHZLWKGUDZQGXHWRWKHSROLFHIDLOLQJ
to send a file in time for the first hearing and secondly where the police had previously 
decided to take no further action on a file but later referred the file to the CPS for a 
charging decision. Again, like in the existing grounds, no specific mention is made to 
WKH YLFWLP¶V YLHZV LQ HLWKHU of these new grounds for reconsidering a prosecutorial 
decision. In fact, it took two years from the date of judgment in Killick for the DPP to 
publish a revised, discrete scheme for requests to review terminatory decisions. 
 
ii. The challenge is accepted by the DPP 
The eventual response by the DPP to the criticism in Killick seemingly elevated the 
position of victims faced with terminatory decisions through the creation of a specific 
scheme for victims to seek reviews of such decisions. In June 2013 the Attorney-
General Mr Dominic Grieve announced in Parliament that the DPP had published 
LQWHULPPDQGDWRU\JXLGDQFHWRWKH&36RQKDQGOLQJFDVHVWKDWJLYHULVHWRDYLFWLP¶V
right to review.37 7KH9LFWLPV
5LJKWWR5HYLHZ,QWHULP*XLGDQFH³,QWHULP*XLGDQFH´
was to have immediate effect for qualifying decisions defined as decisions taken from 
5 June 2013 onwards by the CPS not to charge or to discontinue proceedings or offer 
                                                          
35
 Hansard, HC Deb 31 October 2012, vol 552. 
36
 See Hansard (n 3). 
37
 Hansard, HC Deb 5 June 2013, vol 563. 
39 
 
no evidence in proceedings.38 The reason provided for the instigation of this guidance 
was the judgment in Killick.39 The Interim Guidance applied to all victims subject to a 
TXDOLI\LQJGHFLVLRQDQGWKHWHUPµYLFWLP¶ZDVJLYHQWKHVDPHGHILQLWLRQDVLQWKH&RGH
which is 'Any person who has made an allegation to the police, or had an allegation 
made on his or her behalf, that they have been directly subjected to criminal conduct 
under the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS)'.40 Victims were to be notified 
of the qualifying decision and their right to seek a review of it which is triggered by the 
victim contacting their local CPS office or CPS Direct, whichever body made the initial 
GHFLVLRQ 7KH XQGHUO\LQJ ORJLF DSSHDUV WR EH WKH UHPRYDO RI µFRPSODLQWV¶ PDGH E\
victims concerning decisions not to prosecute from the general CPS complaints 
procHGXUH DQG LQVWHDG LQVWLJDWLQJ D VHSDUDWH VFKHPH GHGLFDWHG VROHO\ WR YLFWLPV¶
requests for reviews of decisions not to prosecute. Crucially, in creating the VRRS the 
YLFWLP¶V SURPLQHQFH DW WKLV VWDJH LQ FULPLQDO SURFHHGLQJV DSSHDUV WR EH JUHDWO\
increased in that their right to seek a review has a specific scheme with a more 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGSURFHGXUHWKDQWKHSUHYLRXVFRPSODLQW¶VURXWH- especially considering 
that for the first time the victim is expressly informed of that right and procedure at the 
time they are informed of the decision not to prosecute. 
Arguably the VRRS made very little change to the substance of the procedure 
once a request for a review, rather than a complaint, has been made. The various 
steps in the procedure, as set out below, are not dissimilar to the previous three tier 
process detailed above.  
First, the VRRS guidance suggested that after initial contact through the VRRS 
by the victim has been made, it may be possible to resolve the issue locally by helping 
victims to understand the decision or by looking again at the decision to confirm that it 
is correct.41 In other words, by better explaining the decision to a victim, a full blown 
review may be averted. This may well relate to the ongoing drive to increase 
efficiencies in the criminal justice system, itself a typical neoliberal characteristic, by 
saving the time and cost of a full review.  
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decision will be subject to review. This is a reconsideration of the case de novo 
conducted independently from the original prosecutor and their part of the CPS by the 
Appeals and Review Unit who need to be satisfied that the earlier decision was wrong 
LQRUGHUFRQFHUQLQJWKHWZRVWDJH)XOO&RGHWHVWDQGWKDWµIRUWhe maintenance of public 
FRQILGHQFH WKH GHFLVLRQ PXVW EH UHYHUVHG¶42 There are prescribed time limits for 
seeking a review and completing it. Such an independent review is effectively the 
same as what was previously on offer to the complainant, just with a new scheme 
name and better communication with the complainant. 
The Interim Guidance was subjected to a three month public consultation which 
received 64 responses, with 15 percent of those from individuals, 34 percent from 
organisations and 51 percent from criminal justice agencies.43 The consultation asked 
five questions concerning the Interim Guidance and the responses to the consultation 
did not lead to any substantial alterations to the guidance. The changes made before 
the Final Guidance was published involved increased detail being provided to explain 
the scope of the guidance, more information on alternative options available to victims 
challenging decisions and the time limits for this procedure. Thus in substance nothing 
changed in the scheme. The interim guidance was replaced by the final guidance 
which came into force on 21 July 2014.44 The final guidance explains that for cases 
submitted to the CPS on or after 10 December 2013, the definition of victim, for the 
purposes of the VRRS has changed under the revised Code as follows to: 'A person 
who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss 
which was directly caused by criminal conduct'.45  
Arguably this widens the number of people who qualify as a victim for the 
purposes of the VRRS. Timescales for seeking a review are prescribed and the review 
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process is established commencing with local resolution by a prosecutor who has not 
been involved with the case previously and progressing as necessary to independent 
review by a reviewing prosecutor, independent of the original decision, approaching 
the case afresh. Certainly the scheme has fulfilled the dicta comments of Lord Justice 
Thomas in KIllick by instigating a clearer procedure and guidance with time limits for 
the way the right of a victim to seek a review is conducted. The question I shall next 
consider, however, is whether the new scheme actually changes the substance of the 
UHYLHZDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHYLFWLP¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHSURVHFXWRULDOSURFHVV" 
   
iii. The more things change, the more they stay the same? 
Having set out the haphazard arrangements for victims seeking a review of a decision 
taken by the CPS not to prosecute prior to the creation of the VRRS I then detailed 
how the VRRS came about following the critical dicta in Killick and the substance of 
the new scheme. In this part of the chapter I shall firstly consider how the VRRS has 
been lauded by its proponents as a significant advancement for victims caught up on 
the periphery of an adversarial criminal trial process which denies them the 
advantages of being a party to the proceedings. Secondly I shall contrast the praise 
with critiques of the scheme deemed to be too narrow in its reach and arguably paying 
QRWKLQJPRUHWKDQOLSVHUYLFHWRWKHYLFWLP¶VULJKts by failing to alter their position in the 
prosecutorial process. 
Progression 
When the DPP Keir Starmer launched the VRRS he emphasised how important the 
LQLWLDWLYHZDVIRUYLFWLPVRIFULPHH[DOWLQJWKHVFKHPHDVµRQHRIWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQW
victim initLDWLYHVHYHUODXQFKHGE\WKH&36¶46 Certainly the VRRS has been described 
DVµDQLPSRUWDQWWRROIRUYLFWLPV¶SODFLQJWKHYLFWLPPRUHFHQWUDOO\LQWKHGHFLVLRQWR
prosecute and enabling them to question decisions taken by the CPS more readily.47 
The scheme has garnered support from those who represent the interests of victims 
with Javed Khan, the chief executive of the independent charity Victim Support, 
ZHOFRPLQJ WKH9556 LQGLFDWLQJ WKDW LW µVWUHQJWKHQV WKH ULJKWVRIYLFWLPVGXULQJ WKH
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criminal justice proFHVV¶48 Victim Support is one of the non-governmental agencies 
which plays a role in a responsibilised system, especially in their mandate as the 




On the other hand, the reach of the VRRS as to who qualifies to take advantage of it 
can be criticised, with many victims seemingly falling outside of the scheme due to the 
GHFLVLRQVLPSDFWLQJRQWKHPQRWEHLQJGHHPHGDVµTXDOLI\LQJ¶7KH9556LWVHOIVHWV
out the three criteria that make a decision a qualifying one49 and then lists nine cases 
that do not fall within its scope.50 Two of these nine scenarios have raised particular 
concern amongst critics. The first concerns cases where the police exercise their 
independent discretion not to investigate necessitate the victim to seek a review from 
the individual police force, essentially giving the victim rights akin to the situation pre-
Killick. It is difficult to provide a figure as to how many victims this might exclude from 
WKHVFKHPHEXW+HU0DMHVW\
V,QVSHFWRUDWHRI&RQVWDEXODU\³+0,&´KDYHORRNHGDW
the extent police recorded crime data can be trusted and concluded that there is an 
under-recording of 19 percent by the police with over 800,000 crimes reported to the 
police not being recorded each year.51 In the sample of decisions researched by HMIC, 
of the 3246 crimes that were correctly recorded 20 percent were later removed or 
cancelled as recorded crimes for no good reason.52 Even before the final guidance 
was published, concerns were being raised as to the number of victims whose 
decisions do not amount to qualifying decisions due to this potential lack of referral by 
the police to the CPS. On 7 January 2014, during the period when the CPS was 
considering the responses to the three month consultation which had closed on 5 
September 2013, Andy McDonald, a Labour member of parliament, asked whether 
the Attorney-General Mr Dominic Grieve was concerned that the VRRS does not cover 
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cases which are dropped by the police before they reach the CPS.53 He suggested 
that fewer cases are being referred to the CPS thus more cases are being dropped at 
an earlier stage, which seems to be supported by the subsequent HMIC figures. The 
Attorney-General responded by explaining that there may be other explanations for 
the fall both in prosecutions and cases being referred for decisions, one of which being 
that the noticeable fall in crime is leading to fewer cases coming to the police in the 
first place.54 In his response he failed to address the actual concern about victims 
falling outside of the scheme. 
The second of the nine scenarios causing particular concern relates to cases 
which are concluded by way of an out of court disposal.55 The HMIC looked at 3,842 
such disposals and found that 13 percent had been unsuitable for the sanction applied 
DQGVKRXOGKDYHUHFHLYHGRQHZKLFKZDVPRUHVHYHUHZLWKWKHYLFWLPV¶ZLVKHVKDYLQJ
been properly considered in only 60 percent of the cases which had a victim.56 These 
two excluded scenarios alone represent a sizeable proportion of victims who do not 
benefit from the VRRS, with 13 percent of those missing out inappropriately due to the 
unsuitability of the decision taken. Julie Hilling, a Labour member of parliament, had 
earlier put to the Attorney-General that there have been 600 requests under the VRRS 
VLQFH LWV LQFHSWLRQ VL[ PRQWKV HDUOLHU DQG WKDW µJLYHQ WKDW OHYHO RI GHPDQG¶ WKH
Government ought to consider including decisions to caution instead of charge and 
decisions to alter substantially the original charge. 57 The Attorney-General confirmed 
that there had been 662 requests of which 18 were upheld (0.02 percent). He stated 
³, DP XWWHUO\ SUDJPDWLF DERXW WKLV , ZLVK WR VHH YLFWLPV¶ ULJKWV DW WKH KHDUW RI WKH
criminal justice system, but there are significant changes and we need first to see how 
well the system is operating and, in particular, how it will operate once the CPS 
UHVSRQGV LQ )HEUXDU\ WR LWV FRQVXOWDWLRQ´58 Nothing did change following the 
consultation in relation to the definition of qualifying decisions, with these criticisms as 
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to the effectiveness of the scheme failing to be addressed yet with the same rhetoric 
of increased rights and participation of victims being repeatedly emphasised.  
Another critique of the effectiveness of the VRRS impacts not on those who do 
not qualify to use the scheme but upon those victims whose decisions do qualify for 
the VRRS since the courts have held that it will be very difficult to mount a successful 
challenge to the decision not to prosecute by way of judicial review proceedings. For 
example, in L v DPP59 two appellants unsuccessfully sought judicial review of 
decisions not to prosecute that had already been reviewed by the CPS. Sir John 
Thomas noted that the new VRRS has consequences for subsequent judicial review 
SURFHHGLQJV VLQFH ZKHUH WKH UHYLHZ FDQ EH VHHQ WR EH µFDUHIXO DQG WKRURXJK
proceedings for judicial review to challenge the decision will be the more difficult to 
DGYDQFH¶60 unless the decision can be said to involve some unlawful policy, the DPP 
has failed to act in accordance with his own set policy, or the decision was perverse.61 
The VRRS has therefore effectively limited the availability of judicial review as a means 
of challenging an adverse decision for the victim. The available data on the CPS 
website supports this qualitative observation. Between 1 April 2014 and 31 March 
2015, in 1,674 cases reviewed by the CPS 210 decisions have been overturned, which 
accounts for 0.17 percent of all qualifying decisions finalised in the period.62 The 
remaining 99.83 percent of aggrieved victims would therefore have difficulty mounting 
a judicial review of the decision having had it reviewed through the VRRS. 
It is my contention that to put into context these diametrically opposed 
sentiments of both support for and criticism of the VRRS, and to understand the 
underlying rationale of the scheme, it is necessary to consider the political justifications 
driving this victim led reform, which I shall do in the next part of this chapter. The VRRS 
embodies elements of the neoliberal consumer-led discourse by giving the victim, who 
could be identified as a consumer in the criminal justice system, a perceived voice 
within the fundamentally liberal trial institution, which traditionally fails to recognise the 
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victim as anything other than another witness. In so doing, it sits squarely in the 
neoliberal paradigm by exhibiting the traits introduced earlier in chapter one, and to be 
considered more fully below, such as individualisation and responsibilisation of the 
victim. And yet by only encouraging more active victim participation, as opposed to 
bringing about any change as to how the decision whether to prosecute or not is taken, 
the reforms, despite being neoliberal in nature, fail to impact much on the liberal trial, 
as considered at the end of this chapter, and its basis for legitimacy, which is the main 
argument of this thesis, detailed in the final chapter.  
I shall next consider how the VRRS embodies the neoliberal discourse before 
concluding this chapter by inquiring about the effect of the fundamentally neoliberal 
VRRS on the liberal nature of the trial.  
 
3. A prototypical reform in the neoliberal tradition 
Given its negligible impact on the fundamental contest at the heart of the criminal trial, 
the VRRS cannot be adequately accounted for by the typical liberal justifications for 
the trial such as the sanctioning of the coercive punishment of the individual who has 
been fairly convicted of committing an offence. Rather this reform appears to fit with 
the neoliberal imperatives of extending and disseminating market values to all aspects 
of life, by encouraging more active victim participation and exhibiting neoliberal traits 
such as both individualisation and responsibilisation of the victim, as introduced in 
chapter  one. This section shall consider how the VRRS arguably arises from what 
KDYHEHHQWHUPHG³QHROLEHUDO´ ORJLFVRIJRYHUQDQFHby seemingly empowering and 
incentivising the individual, promoting collaboration rather than tension between the 
state and the individual. 
Wendy Brown talks about neoliberal political rationality emerging as 
JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\SURGXFLQJµVXEMHFWVIRUPVRIFLWL]HQVKLSDQGEHKDYLRXUDQGDQHZ
RUJDQLVDWLRQ RI WKH VRFLDO¶63 ZKLFK LQYROYHV µH[WHQGLQJ DQG GLVVHPLQDWLQJ PDUNHW
YDOXHVWRDOOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVRFLDODFWLRQ¶64 In so doing individuals are constructed as 
self-entrepreneurs, carrying full responsibility for the self, strategizing for him or 
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herself. By considering the evolutions in the criminal justice system by drawing on this 
analysis of governmentality, the traditional top-down command modality of using the 
police, the courts and the prisons is being gradually displaced by the newer bottom-
up technique of governance by enlisting others and creating new forms of co-
operation. Giving the victim a voice in criminal proceedings could be seen as a clear 
example of this rationality in action, enlisting the victim by empowering them in order 
to encourage their co-operation in the criminal justice system. The empowerment of 
having a right to seek a review of a prosecutorial decision terminating the possibility 
of proceedings² in a newly created, exclusive scheme where previously nothing 
existed² fits the neoliberal paradigm of the model citizen who strategises for himself 
and bears responsibility in matters affecting them. 
 For some time, a move towards responsibilisation from the state to public and 
private agents has been charted in the arena of crime prevention. David Garland 
considered the identification of those who can reduce criminal opportunities and the 
techniques of persuasion used to target the public as a whole, raising public 
consciousness, interpellating the citizen as a potential victim and creating a sense of 
duty.65 One example features in the UK Government's Interdepartmental Circular on 
Crime Prevention which opened with the declaration that: 
A primary objective of the police has always been the prevention of crime. However, 
since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of 
the police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and 
all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime 
should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the whole community.66  
A clear present example of this in action is the anti-terrorism strategies most western 
liberal democracies have adopted where citizens are asked to be vigilant and report 
µVXVSLFLRXV¶SHRSOHDQGWKLQJV. The VRRS is extending the tenets of responsibilisation 
from crime prevention to the prosecution of crime. In giving victims the right to question 
some prosecutorial decisions, the VRRS is seemingly promoting cooperation almost 
akin to joint responsibility in as much as intervention by victims can lead to 
reconsideration of the decision as to how to proceed with a case.  
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 As well as fostering the responsibilisation of the victim, the VRRS promotes the 
individualisation of proceeding in favour of the victim. Michel Foucault described how 
LQ D GLVFLSOLQDU\ UHJLPH µLQGLYLGXDOLVDWLRQ LV µGHVFHQGLQJ¶ DV SRZHU EHFRPHV PRUH
anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more 
VWURQJO\ LQGLYLGXDOLVHG¶67 Having already considered the shift in focus from the 
powerful figureheads to the criminal in chapter one, the VRRS is illustrative of further 
movement, this time in favour of the victim of crime. In the aforementioned press 
release accompanying the launch of the VRRS, the then DPP Keir Starmer QC, 
emphasised how the new scheme was demonstrating how attitudes to victims, 
previously viewed as bystanders, have changed in that: 
it is now recognised by the criminal justice system that the interests of justice and the 
rights of the victim can outweigh the suspect's right to certainty «,WUHFRJQLVHVWKDW
victims are active participants in the criminal justice process, with both interests to 
protect and rights to enforce (own emphasis added).68  
On a practical level, by making reference to the rights of the victim the DPP is seeking 
to remove any lasting negative connotations from the previous complaints procedure. 
Arguably though by making reference to active participation of victims in the criminal 
justice process, the DPP is championing the individualisation of proceedings in favour 
of victims by giving victims more of an individual voice in managing the course of the 
proceedings that affect them.  
 It is my contention that both the responsibilisation of the victim and the 
individualisation of the process feed into the prevailing issue, which is the overriding 
imperative of enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system. This is 
demonstrated in the language used by those in power when discussing victims of 
crime as service users69 and can be explicitly seen when the VRRS is being 
championed as inspiring confidence in the system. On 23 June 2015 in a debate 
concerning the work of the CPS the Solicitor General Robert Buckland referred to the 
9556 DV µDQ H[WUD VDIHW\ YDOYH WKDW JRHV D ORQJ ZD\ as I said in relation to our 
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VWUDWHJ\WRHQKDQFHSXEOLFFRQILGHQFHLQWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP¶70 Similarly Keir 
Starmer argues that the VRRS is justified in adjusting the principle of finality in relation 
to decisions taken not to prosecute since it increases the public confidence in the 
administration of justice.71 
 To conclude this chapter I shall explore to what extent the VRRS encroaches 
on the liberal trial. 
 
)DLOLQJWRSXWWKHµQHR¶LQWKHOLEHUDOWULDO 
We have seen at length how in the context of the introduction of the VRRS, significant 
reforms have been made to the manner and degree of involvement of the victim in the 
criminal trial. Moreover, the arguably neoliberal character of these reforms seems to 
herald a new era for the trial, and one which²following Wendy Brown²we might 
FRQVLGHU DV OHVV WKDQ HQWLUHO\ FRQFRUGDQW ZLWK WKH WULDO¶V OLEHUDO XQGHUSLQQLQJV DQG
rationale. By extending market values to the non-market trial arena, the VRRS has 
empowered the victim to take some responsibility for decisions affecting their case 
and individualised the proceedings whilst seeking to enhance confidence in the 
criminal justice system. Yet closer examination reveals that these reforms, though 
significant, remain in some sense tangential to both the fundamental business of the 
trial and its political philosophical rationale. In this section we will see how this is so, 
since despite the neoliberal imperatives embodied in the VRRS, the liberal nature of 
the criminal trial remains intact, providing condemnation and punishment for those who 
break the criminal law in a fair process.  
First, consider that the VRRS remains circumscribed to a limited ambit. For 
example, it in no way alters the fact that it is the CPS who decide whether or not to 
commence criminal proceedings and if so, who conducts those proceedings, or 
essentially how they are conducted, thus maintaining the dichotomous nature of the 
proceedings between the state and the defendant. Certainly the recognition in Killick 
RI WKHYLFWLP¶VULJKW WRVHHNDUHYLHZRIDQ\ WHUPLQDWRU\GHFLVLRQ WDNHQE\ WKH&36
prompted the DPP to take such requests for a review out of the general CPS 
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complaints procedure. In creating the VRRS, victims have a simpler, more accessible, 
transparent course to pursue yet ultimately the review is conducted by the CPS just 
as it was under the old complaints procedure. Indeed, by formalising the procedure it 
would seem that the VRRS has reduced the possibility of successfully seeking a 
judicial review of the terminatory decision. Jonathan Doak has advanced the view that 
LQWKHOLEHUDOWUDGLWLRQµWKHLQWHUHVWVRIFHUWDLQW\DQGSXEOLFSROLF\UHTXLUHWKDWGHFLVLRQ-
making is always exercised by a non-SDUWLVDQDGMXGLFDWRU¶72 and indeed, ultimately 
the decision-making remains with the CPS.  
In 2005 Brown spoke of neoliberal governmentality undermining the autonomy 
of the law and the police amongst other institutions from the market and one another,73 
FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW µOLEHUDO GHPRFUDF\ FDQQRW EH VXEPLWWHd to neoliberal political 
JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\DQGVXUYLYH¶74 A decade later she reiterates the erosion of the liberal 
LQVWLWXWLRQZKHQVKHVWDWHV WKDW µJRYHUQDQFHDFFRUGLQJ WRPDUNHWPHWULFVGLVSODFHV
classic liberal democratic concerns with justice and balancLQJ GLYHUVH LQWHUHVWV¶75 
Whilst in relation to her own examples these observations carry significant weight, in 
the particular context of the criminal trial her conclusions are not borne out by the 
impact of the VRRS. Despite modifying the input of victims at the decision-making 
stage for whether to commence proceedings, this scheme does not elevate the 
participating victim to the level of decision maker. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, in this chapter I have analysed one example from a body of recent victim-
centric reforms, focusing on why the reform was instigated, by whom and to what end. 
In so doing, I have established that the VRRS has established a point of contact 
between the victim and the criminal justice system, to be considered further in chapter 
4, through the initiation of a specific scheme, at a stage in the proceedings which was 
previously remote to them. The scheme bears all the hallmarks of neoliberal rationality, 
by engaging the victim, as a consumer of the system, in a user-friendly process, in 
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order to individualise the proceedings and responsibilise the victim. And yet, for all the 
accompanying rhetoric and increased engagement, very little seems to have changed 
in relation to direct involvement in the prosecutorial decision-making process for 
victims of crime and indeed for the liberal values underpinning the trial system. 
 In the next chapter I analyse another reform brought about during the same 
time period, which impacts the other end of the time-line in typical criminal cases, 
being the sentencing exercise. In so doing, it will be possible to contrast and compare 
the impact of these reforms on the criminal justice system in order to consider their 





Chapter III. The Victim Personal Statement 
,Q WKH SUHFHGLQJ FKDSWHU , FRQVLGHUHG WKH PRWLYDWLRQV IRU UHIRUPLQJ WKH YLFWLP¶V
involvement at an early stage in the prosecutorial process, when the decision had 
been taken not to prosecute the suspect in the case involving the victim. In this chapter 
I shall be looking at a reform which privileges the victim at the other end of the process, 
when the defendant is sentenced, by providing the victim with a specific mechanism 
to express the impact of the offence to the sentencing tribunal. By focusing on these 
two particular neoliberal reforms, I shall be able to draw broader conclusions in the 
final chapter on the impact of the recent victim-centric reforms at large on the existing 
liberal tradition of legitimacy of the criminal trial.  
Under the Victim PersoQDO 6WDWHPHQW ³936´ VFKHPH D victim in criminal 
proceedings, whilst providing a witness statement to the police detailing what they say 
happened to them, is entitled to make a VPS setting out the impact the offending 
EHKDYLRXUKDVKDGRQWKHPEHLW µSK\sically, emotionally, financially or in any other 
ZD\¶1 This revised VPS scheme is embedded in the Code of Practice for Victims of 
&ULPH ³WKH &RGH´2 which details a number of the services and the minimum 
standards for these services that must be provided to victims of crime by various 
criminal justice organisations in England and Wales following an allegation of criminal 
conduct. Since its inception in 2006 the Code has had a number of revisions, with the 
most recent version coming into effect on 16 November 2015.3 The VPS scheme was 
only inserted into the Code during its major overhaul in 2013; the same year as the 
9LFWLP¶V5LJKWWR5HYLHZ6FKHPHZDVLQWURGXFHG 
Originally the concept of a victim being given the chance to say how a crime 
had affected WKHPZDVFRQFHLYHGLQWKH9LFWLP¶V&KDUWHULQ4 The Charter outlined 
the standards of service that victims of crime could expect when engaging with the 
criminal justice system, without providing any legal requirement to deliver such 
standards. The VPS scheme was formalised by way of Home Office Circular in 2001 
following evaluated pilot projects that confirmed a demand for a formal scheme, rather 
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than relying upon the generalised standard contained in the Charter that victims of 
crime should be given the chance to say how the crime had affected them.5 The stated 
LQWHQWLRQRIWKH936VFKHPHFRQWDLQHGLQWKH&LUFXODUZDVWRµJLYHYLFWLPVRIFULPHD
PRUHIRUPDORSSRUWXQLW\WRVD\KRZWKH\KDYHEHHQDIIHFWHGE\WKHFULPH¶6 by giving 
victims the chance, although not a legal right, to specifically write about how the 
criminal conduct had affected them when providing a written witness statement. The 
subsequent inclusion of the VPS in the Code in 2013 not only provided a statutory 
footing for the scheme, thereby making the opportunity to write a VPS a legal 
requirement, but also increased its remit by enabling victims to read out their VPS in 
court during sentencing if they so wished, rather than the CPS prosecutor simply 
making reference to it on their behalf. It is worth noting that the timing of the VPS 
scheme achieving statutory recognition coincides with the creation of the VRRS in 
2013, as earlier considered in chapter two. The processes leading to these two victim-
centric measures are different but I contend that the fact they happened at a similar 
time helps to illustrate the changing nature of how the criminal trial process is being 
legitimised, which I shall consider in chapter four.  
In looking at this reform I am seeking to understand how it changes the role of 
the victim in an exercise which traditionally focuses predominantly on the defendant. 
It is my contention that this scheme, in similarity to the VRRS, exhibits neoliberal 
paradigms in seeking to individualise the proceedings away from the defendant and 
towards the victim. Arguably the VPS goes further than the VRRS in fostering the 
responsibilisation of the victim by providing a mechanism to physically be heard in 
court at such a key stage in the proceedings. Additionally, in contrast to the VRRS, the 
VPS scheme displays personalisation traits by appealing to the victim, in language 
that is indicative of a consumer being afforded enhanced rights, to recount the impact 
of the crime at a time when an offender, who poses a risk to society, will potentially be 
removed from society by incapacitation, as elucidated further below in part III of this 
chapter. I intend to consider the neoliberal imperatives driving this reform and the 
extent of encroachment on the fundamentally liberal nature of criminal proceedings.  
In looking at the reforms to the VPS firstly I shall consider what role the victim 
traditionally played in the sentencing of the defendant. Secondly I shall explore how 
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the VPS privileges the victim at this stage in the proceedings. Thirdly I shall consider 
what neoliberal conditions engendered this reform. Lastly I shall consider the impact 
that this scheme has on the liberal trial institution.  
I start by considering to what extent the victim was involved in the sentencing 
exercise prior to the establishment of the VPS scheme. 
 
1. No place for the victim when sentencing the defendant 
The historic change from victims seeking private vengeance to the state initiating both 
criminal proceedings and punishment, following the centralisation of power, has been 
well documented7 and as we saw in the introduction to this thesis, has resulted in 
victims playing only a secondary role in criminal proceedings. Whilst considering the 
politico-historical argument that the state took over criminal proceedings from the 
victim in order to bolster its power, Andrew Ashworth raises three points of principle, 
derived from normative propositions rather than any jurisprudential or statutory basis, 
ZKLFKKDYHDEHDULQJRQWKHQDWXUHDQGH[WHQWRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVGXULQJVHQtencing.8 
)LUVWWKHYLFWLP¶VOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWLVQRWLQWKHIRUPRUTXDQWXPRIWKHSXQLVKPHQWRI
the offender but rather in compensation and/or reparation from the offender.9 There 
are mechanisms in place for compensating a victim of crime, such as the requirement 
to consider making a compensation order upon conviction for any personal injury, loss 
or damage instead of, or in addition to, any other penalty10 or the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme for victims of violent crime.11 Aside from such reparation the 
YLFWLP¶V LQWHUHVW LQWKHSXQLVKPHQWRI WKHRIIHQGHU LVGHHPHGE\$VKZRUWKWREHQR
greater than any other citizen. Second, the principle of proportionality of sentencing 
for an offence, whereby there is an equivalence between the seriousness of the 
offence and the severity of the punishment, goes against victim involvement in 
sentencing decisions because the views of individual victims may vary.12 Using the 
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extremities as an exemplar, proportionality would be lost if sentences were augmented 
by the views of a victim seeking vengeance as opposed to being reduced when the 
victim has a highly forgiving nature. Last, the fundamental principle of a right to a fair 
hearing is challenged if a victim plays a part in determining the disposition of a criminal 
case since a victim cannot be deemed independent or impartial.13 Consequently the 
sentencing exercise has focused on the defendant with no specific recourse to the 
victim. This focus on the defendant, and the points of principle raised by Ashworth, 
illustrate the liberal values embodied in sanctioning the coercive punishment of the 
fairly convicted individual by the state, with no particular role or special status for the 
victim, which are typically recognised as underpinning the criminal trial, as previously 
considered in chapter  one. 
Time and again the English courts have underlined that the views of the victim 
on the appropriate sentence for the defendant are irrelevant, as opposed to the 
consequences of the offence on them, which are to be taken into account by the court 
when determining the sentence.14 In Attorney General's Reference (No 72 of 1998); R 
v Hayes15, an unusual case in that the victim was a 95 year old lady who was the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V*UHDW-Grandmother, Lord Justice Judge emphasised that the views of the 
victim, for or against the defendant, cannot be taken into account when sentencing, 
stating that: 
the sentence of the court cannot depend on the wishes of those most affected by the 
crime under consideration. Crimes perpetrated against vengeful victims would be 
sentenced differently and much more severely than identical crimes committed against 
merciful victims. What is more, there are many crimes with more than one victim, and 
different victims of the same crime might, and sometimes do, take very different views. 
In addition, many victims simply do not want to have the responsibility or be subject to 
the inevitable pressures that would be created on them if their views were reflected in 
the sentencing process. That, many of them feel, is a matter for the court, and they are 
right.16 
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He concluded by stressing that this does not mean that the victim is to be ignored in 
the sentencing exercise but that overall responsibility rests with the Judge having 
taken into account the impact of the crime on the victim. Such judicial responsibility 
can be contrasted to the neoliberal concept of responsibilisation due to the 
independence of the judiciary and their separation from the government.  
 The first shift towards increased victim participation in sentencing in England 
and Wales emerged in the commitments made by the Government in the revised 
9LFWLPV¶&KDUWHU17 which simply communicated to victims that they could expect the 
chance to explain how the crime had affected them, that their interests would be taken 
into account and in some circumstances the police would offer them the opportunity 
to complete a VPS which would be taken into account by the police, Crown Prosecutor, 
magistrates and judges when making their decisions.18 Hence VPSs were not 
restricted to, or indeed directed towards, sentencing decisions but they provided the 
victim with a mechanism to express the impact of the offence on them for use by 
multiple agencies concerned in the proceedings against the defendant. However, the 
direct therapeutic value to victims in writing a VPS has been considered and should 
not be underestimated.19 That said, the Charter provided no clarification as to which 
circumstances would prompt the police to offer a victim the chance to provide a VPS. 
Further it has been noted that it was unclear whether VPSs were actually meant to 
inform sentencing decisions at all, with differing opinions being proffered by different 
criminal justice agencies.20  
Following pilot projects, the Home Office implemented a formal VPS Scheme 
nationwide in 2001.21 This did assist in clarifying whether VPSs were to be used during 
the sentencing of offenders but arguably led to further ambiguities. The circular stated 
WKDWWKH936VFKHPHµLVQRWSULPDULO\DVHQWHQFLQJWRRO«EXWQRQHWKHOHVVLID93S) 
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has been made it could prove helpful to magistrates and judges in cases that do 
LQYROYHFRXUWSURFHHGLQJV¶22 Academic comment at the time queried what was meant 
E\ WKHVRPHZKDWFRQWUDGLFWRU\SKUDVHV µSULPDULO\¶DQG µLWFRXOGSURYHKHOSIXO¶VLQFH
they were not further elucidated upon.23 Adrian Turner opined the scheme as an 
XQKHOSIXOGHYHORSPHQWHVSHFLDOO\ LI WKHYLFWLP¶VYLHZVDIIHFWHGVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQ-
PDNLQJDVµLWZLOOGHWUDFWIURPWKHFHQWUDOQRWLRQRIFULPLQDOODZZKLFKLVWKDWHYHU\RQH
is a potential victim of crime and, therefore, we all have a stake in the prosecution and 
SXQLVKPHQWRIRIIHQGHUV¶24 Turner went on to list what effectively amount to the typical 
OLEHUDOYDOXHVHPERGLHGLQWKH(QJOLVKDGYHUVDULDOPRGHORIFULPLQDOWULDORIµWKHSXEOic 
condemnation of crime where consistency, proportionality, detachment and fairness 
>DUH WKH NH\ IHDWXUHV@¶25 expressing his concerns that a victim-led system would 
encroach on these values. Certainly the Circular advised police officers not to promise 
victims more than the scheme could deliver, stating that should the victim want to 
express an opinion as to how an offender should be punished, they should be clearly 
told that judges and magistrates are unlikely to take this into account, although they 
will have regard to the effect the crime has had on the victim.26 This seems to reinforce 
the more pastoral role of the measure, using the VPS as a means for identifying the 
needs of the victim in the process, rather than providing the victim with a more 
participatory role in the sentencing process. This is akin to the distinction, previously 
FRQVLGHUHG LQ FKDSWHU WZR EHWZHHQ VHUYLFH ULJKWV DLPHG DW IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH YLFWLPV¶
experience in the system, and procedural rights providing victims with a participatory 
role in the decision making process. 
The Circular clarified the earlier ambiguity as to which victims might be offered 
the opportunity to complete a VPS by expressing for the first time that all victims should 
be informed of the process and, should they choose to provide a VPS, it should be 
taken when their witness statement is taken although it can be provided at any stage 
of the proceedings.27 To this extent, in addition to the creation of leaflets for those 
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concerned, the formalisation of the VPS assisted in clarifying its role and usage in 
proceedings. 
The judiciary responded to this development by setting out what a court should 
do when presented with a VPS.28 Lord Woolf CJ confirmed that the scheme enabled 
courts to consider and take a VPS into account prior to sentencing provided the 
evidence was in a proper form and had been properly served on the defence.29 It was 
made very clear, however, that the sentencing exercise remained focused on the 
Defendant, rather than the victim, since the court was instructed to maintain its 
DWWHQWLRQRQWKHGHIHQGDQWKDYLQJµUHJDUGWRWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHRIIHQFHDQGWKH
offender taking into account, so far as the court considers it appropriate, the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVWRWKHYLFWLP¶30 As if to emphasise this point the directions continued 
by stating that any opinions expressed by the victim as to the appropriate sentence 
were not relevant and were to be disregarded.31  
 ,Q  WKH 9LFWLP¶V &KDUWHU ZDV VXSHUVHGHG E\ WKH &RGH RI 3UDFWLFH IRU
Victims of Crime, but the provisions on VPSs were not integrated into it. They remained 
a national standard rather than having a statutory basis, which could have been 
provided by the Code. Consequently courts were neither required to inquire about the 
existence of VPSs nor were they statutorily obliged to consider them, albeit judicial 
practice directions continued to instruct courts to consider VPSs.32  
In the next part of this chapter I shall consider the revisions made to the VPS 
scheme, what triggered the changes and how these changes privilege the victim. 
  
2. A new home for the VPS scheme and for the victim in the court hearing  
The VPS was inserted into the revised Code in 2013, providing statutory footing to the 
previously national standard scheme formalised in 2001. In this part of the chapter I 
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shall consider first the circumstances which triggered the changes to the existing VPS 
scheme and second the how these changes privilege the victim. 
 
i. The trigger for change 
In 2011, ten years after the Government formalised the VPS scheme in England and 
Wales, the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses in England and Wales33 
requested a report summarising empirical research into the use of victim statements,34 
as part of her task of garnering and promoting the views of victims in the first 18 months 
in the newly created post.35 7KH UHSRUW¶V DXWKRUV XVHG GDWD GHULYHG IURP YLFWLPV
interviewed for the national quarterly Witness and Victim Experience Surveys 
conducted between 2007/8 and 2009/10.36 Their findings revealed that during that 
period only 42 percent of the victims interviewed recalled being offered the opportunity 
to make a VPS; of those 55 percent stated that they completed a VPS; and of those 
only 39 percent felt that the statement had been fully taken into account.37 The report 
QRWHGWKDWµWKHGHVLUHWRFRPPXQLFDWHDPHVVDJHWRWKHFRXUWDQGWKHRIIHQGHU¶ZDV
the most frequent reasoQSURYLGHGIRUFRPSOHWLQJD936ZLWKVRPHYLFWLPVZLVKLQJµWR
LQIOXHQFHWKHVHYHULW\RIWKHVHQWHQFHLPSRVHG¶38  
The report also concluded that those victims who did submit a statement 
appeared more satisfied with the sentencing process than those who chose not to 
participate.39 The question of victim satisfaction was considered because one of the 
reasons for creating VPSs was to promote victim welfare. To evaluate the benefit of 
VPSs to victims the report authors, Roberts and Manikis, considered existing research 
LQRUGHUµLWRFRPSDUHVDWLVIDFWLRQOHYHOVRIYLFWLPVZKRVXEPLWDQGRWKHUVZKRGR
not; and (ii) to ask the former whether, if they were victimised again, they would submit 
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DQRWKHUVWDWHPHQW¶40 On the first point concerning satisfaction levels of participants in 
contrast to non-participants, two studies were considered. In the first study, victim 
VDWLVIDFWLRQHTXDWHGWRZKHWKHUWKHYLFWLPIHOWWKDWSURYLGLQJWKH936KDGEHHQµWKH
ULJKWWKLQJWRGR¶SHUFHQWDQGZKHWKHULWKDGPDGHWKHPIHHOEHWter (almost two 
thirds).41 In the second study, victim satisfaction was measured by whether victims 
were pleased that they had participated (75 percent).42 On the second point 
concerning whether victims would submit a VPS again, Roberts and Manikis suggest 
that affirmative responses indicate a clear measure of victim satisfaction and the 
consistent outcome of several research projects is that most victims state that they 
would submit a statement in the future if they were victimised again.43 The fact that 
victims were surveyed and victim satisfaction was considered as a criterion in itself is 
interesting since the use of market research fits squarely into the neoliberal paradigm 
RIJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\ZLWKµVWDWLVWLFDONQRZOHGJHIXHO>LQJ@ELR-political technologieV¶44  
At around the same time in 2012 the Government were consulting on proposed 
reforms to the criminal justice system to provide proper protection and support for 
victims, with the Secretary of State for Justice noting in his foreword to the public 
FRQVXOWDWLRQ WKDW YLFWLPV WRR RIWHQ IHHO WKHPVHOYHV WR EH DQ DIWHUWKRXJKW DQG µDUH
VRPHWLPHVOHIWIHHOLQJOLNHPHUHDFFHVVRULHVWRWKHV\VWHP¶45 This appears to have 
been identified as a problem for varying reasons including the lack of information being 
provided to victims about the progress of the case and yet this surely conflicts with the 
anti-individualistic rationale for sentencing as earlier considered in this chapter and the 
work of Turner. As a result of the 350 responses to the consultation, the Government 
noted that the Code needed updating and launched another consultation in 2013 
specifically focusing on the Code.46 In her foreword to the consultation the Minister for 
Victims and the Courts detailed how the Government planned to include the VPS 
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scheme in their revised Code for the first time, indicating that it was hoped that the 
proposals went some way to redressing the imbalance caused by the Criminal Justice 
6\VWHPKDYLQJµIRFXVHGKHDYLO\RQWKHSXQLVKPHQWRIRIIHQGHUVZKLOVWJLYLQJWRROLWWOH 
KHHGWRWKHQHHGVRIYLFWLPV¶IRUWRRORQJ47  
Following this consultation, which received 197 formal written responses48, and 
due in part by the need to transpose the EU Victims' Directive49, the Code was revised 
in 2013 to give victims clearer entitlements and to better tailor service to individual 
need, including the VPS in the Code as proposed. ,QKLVIRUHZRUGWRWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
UHVSRQVH'DPLDQ*UHHQ030LQLVWHUIRU9LFWLPVVWDWHGµ)RUWRRORQJYLFWLPVKDYHIHOW
they are treated as an afterthought in the criminal justice system. This must change. 
«,DPDEVROXWHO\GHWHUPLQHGWKDWYLFWLPVDUHJLYHQEDFNWKHLUYRLFHDQGWKH9LFWLP¶V
&RGH LVFUXFLDO WR WKLV¶50 Further updates were made to the Code to complete the 
formal transition of the Victims' Directive in 2015 with the updated version coming into 
effect on 16 November 2015.  
 Next I shall consider how the revised VPS scheme privileges the victim during 
the sentencing exercise. 
 
ii. The impact of the reform 
The VPS scheme was included in the Code when it was revised in 2013 and then 
updated in 2015, placing the scheme on a statutory footing for the first time.51 When 
introducing the revised Code in Parliament, the Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice 
and Victims Damian Green stated that key improvements to the new Victims' Code 
LQFOXGHGµVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHYRLFHRIWKHYLFWLP¶52 by including the VPS in a statutory 
code for the first time and entitling victims to read their statement aloud in court 
themselves during the sentencing hearing if they so wished. The rhetoric of enhancing 
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the role of the victim is further considered below when looking at the neoliberal 
imperatives embodied in the scheme as time and again, as shall be seen, it is the 
SURPLQHQFHRIWKHYLFWLP¶VYRLFHWKDWKHDGOLQHVDQ\FRQVLGHUDWLRQof this reform. 
When considering the substance of the inclusion of the VPS scheme in the 
Code, there are certainly aspects which appear to privilege the victim beyond what 
was previously contained in the original VPS scheme introduced in 2001. Yet again, 
tKHYLFWLP¶VYRLFHLVHPSKDVLVHGZLWKWKHILUVWSDUDJUDSKGHDOLQJZLWK936VVWDWLQJWKDW
µWKH936JLYHV\RXDYRLFHLQWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHSURFHVV¶53 although this is clarified 
with a warning that personal opinions on any eventual punishment of the offender 
should not be expressed.54 This ongoing notion of giving a voice to the victim is 
important since it implies that prior to the reforms they had no or limited say in the 
proceedings and consequently after the reforms they do have a more pivotal role to 
play. The concept of having a voice is a powerful one, potentially evoking the ideal of 
influence over the proceedings. Yet this focus on the victim seems to be in tension 
with the rehabilitative focus on the defendant, whereby they are encouraged to 
understand the impact of their actions as detailed in a VPS. The Code continues to 
detail the scheme talking directly to the victim in terms of their various entitlements 
firstly to make a VPS, secondly to say whether or not they would like to have it read 
aloud in court if the suspect is found guilty and thirdly to say whether they would like 
to read it aloud themselves or to have it read aloud by someone else such as a family 
member or the CPS advocate.55 It is then emphasised that it is for the court to decide 
whether and what sections of the VPS should be read aloud and by whom, taking into 
account the interests and wishes of the victim and that the court will pass sentence 
having regard to all the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, taking into 
account as appropriate the impact of the offence on the victim as set out in the VPS.56 
The most obvious new privilege to the victim is the express provision of the ability of 
a victim to read out their VPS in court at the sentencing hearing should they so wish. 
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Critics, however, have suggested that the VPS scheme embodied in the revised 
Code changes very little for the victim.57 Indeed, the courts had already indicated that 
there was sufficient flexibility for a judge to permit a victim to read out their VPS prior 
to the revisions in the Code.58 Lyndon Harris intimates that the changes made were 
minimal, suggesting that VPSs will be read out by victims with increased frequency, 
but not by much.59 Similarly the then Shadow Justice Secretary Sadiq Khan said: 




to ensure that the Impact Statement is offered to the victim in the first place, and is 
made available in the court on the day of the hearing. With their toothless code, there'll 
be no one taking charge of the Impact Statement, meaning it continues to be 
sidelined.60 
What is interesting to note about the criticisms of the reform is the common assumption 
that the VPS scheme should have changed things for the victim and that consequently 
if nothing changes the reform becomes somehow ineffectual. This stance seems to 
come from a desire to alter the position of the victim in the proceedings, increasing 
their powers to affect the outcome of the proceedings. This is not surprising given the 
language used to herald the scheme as giving victims a voice, as earlier considered. 
And yet by looking at the reform not from the viewpoint of its practical impact on the 
proceedings, but in terms of its effect on legitimising the trial proceedings through 
providing an additional point of contact with the victim, a significant change can be 
noted and I consider this in chapter four. 
In the next part of this chapter I shall consider what neoliberal conditions 
engendered the revisions to the VPS scheme before I conclude the chapter by 
considering the impact this scheme has had on the liberal trial institution. 
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3. A fanfare of neoliberal rhetoric  
In this penultimate part of the chapter I consider how the VPS scheme, embodied in 
the Code, exhibits typical neoliberal modes of governance such as individualisation of 
processes, the responsibilisation of non-governmental actors and the personalisation 
of procedures. I also consider how by increasing the involvement of the victim in the 
sentencing of the offender, the neoliberal zero-tolerance of criminality is reinforced. 
Starting with the concept of individualisation, in their response to the 





strategy to transform the criminal justice system by putting victims first, making the 
V\VWHPPRUHUHVSRQVLYHDQGHDVLHUWRQDYLJDWH¶62 By enabling each individual victim 
to describe specifically for the court how the offending behaviour has impacted on their 
lives and even enabling the victim to read out their VPS in court at sentencing should 
they so wish, the impact of crime is individualised, removing the traditional focus away 
from the motivations of the offender directly onto how this offence has affected this 
particular victim. This is in direct contrast to the anti-individualistic values, articulated 
by Turner and considered above, embodied in the liberal adversarial criminal trial in 
which the proceedings are brought by the state, not the victim, since everyone has a 
stake in those proceedings as a potential victim of crime. 
This turn towards the processes of individualisation increasingly centring upon 
the victim bears RXWZKDW'DYLG*DUODQGQRWHGRYHUDGHFDGHHDUOLHUWKDWµ,QGLYLGXDO
victims are to be kept informed, to be offered the support that they need, to be 
consulted prior to decision-making, to be involved in the judicial process from 
FRPSODLQWWKURXJKWRFRQYLFWLRQDQGEH\RQG¶63 Whilst this shift towards the victim has 
prompted those who represent the defence to respond by voicing their apprehensions, 
IRU H[DPSOH µWKH Foncern for defence lawyers and those specialising in criminal 
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DSSHDOV LV WKDW ZH DUH OLYLQJ WKURXJK DQRWKHU ³UHEDODQFLQJ´ RI RXU FULPLQDO MXVWLFH
system in favour of the rights of victims and moving away from the rights and 
protections afforded to defendanWV¶64  
Turning to the concept of responsibilisation, Foucault describes his concept of 
governmentality as being: 
at once internal and external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which 
make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence 
of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can 
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of 
governmentality.65 
This concept was developHG E\ *DUODQG ZKHQ KH FRQVLGHUHG WKH µSUHGLFDPHQW RI
FULPHFRQWUROLQODWHPRGHUQVRFLHW\¶66 He set out a number of new modes of governing 
FULPH LQFOXGLQJ ZKDW KH FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µD UHVSRQVLELOLVDWLRQ VWUDWHJ\¶67 This 
strategy involves central government acting upon crime indirectly by galvanizing non-
state agencies, organisations and private individuals into action rather than focusing 
on direct action by state agencies such as the police or courts. I contend that the 
features he describes can now be extended beyond crime control to the trial and 
punishment of offenders. By way of example the Code, which now houses the VPS 
scheme, lists 28 organisations required to provide services to victims not including 
other organisations, such as the voluntary sector, who may provide victim support 
services but who are not covered by the Code. The sheer number of organisations 
listed provides one example of the neoliberal paradigm of responsibilisation in action. 
The VPS scheme, contained in this Code, is yet another example of responsibilisation 
by spurring the victims of crime, as private individuals, into action at a stage in the 
proceedings which is usually confined to state actors such as the police and the 
prosecutors.  
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Garland considered the use of publicity campaigns, aimed at raising 
µFRQVFLRXVQHVVFUHDW>LQJ@DVHQVHRIGXW\DQGWKXVFKDQJ>LQJ@SUDFWLFHV¶68 in order to 
bring about action on the part of these non-governmental agencies or individuals. Such 
campaigns are used to reinforce the message that the state alone can no longer be 
solely responsible for preventing and controlling crime and that the individual must 
play their part in this regard. By codifying and then heralding the rights of victims in 
publicity which lets victims know that they are no longeUDQµDIWHUWKRXJKW¶69 but have 
an active role to play in the trial and sentencing process, the Code could be seen as 
an example of such a publicity opportunity, promoting the voice of the victim, a 
participant who is of course generally a necessity for effective prosecutions.  
Acting in a similar vein, the neoliberal technique of personalisation of 
proceedings can also be seen at play here. Personalisation consists of the 
presentation of concepts as an appeal to citizenship whilst in fact importing 
consumerist ideals. It has been noted that the language used in the Code which 
contains the VPS scheme, by talking about "enhanced service" and "entitlements", is 
indicative of treating victims as customers70 whilst creating that sense of duty for the 
victim to engage in the criminal justice process. 
Another typical neoliberal trait encompasses the need to reduce the risks posed 
to self-entrepreneurs by criminals. In chapter four I shall consider how Paul Passavant 
talked about governing through a zero-tolerance mentality whereby certain risks, no 
matter how small, are intolerable.71 One such risk is presented by the criminal, a 
PRQVWHUZKRQHHGVWREHLQFDSDFLWDWHG3DVVDYDQWPDGHUHIHUHQFHWR3DW2¶0DOOH\
who described neoliberalism as entailing two sides ± D ³VRIW VLGH´ GHGLFDWHG WR
FRQVXPHULVPDQGD³KDUGVLGH´GHGLFDWHGWRFULPLQological overkill.72 It is this hard side 
that I suggest can be seen in action in the VPS scheme, at the expense of defendant 
rehabilitation, by appealing to the consumerist victim to recount their experiences and 
the impact of the crime on them in court at the sentencing hearing in order to secure 
the appropriate punishment of the offender and thus remove one such risk from 
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The therapeutic benefit to the victim in writing a VPS is in no way disparaged or indeed 
incompatible with the argument of this thesis (and this particular perspective).  
Garland noted an increasingly dualistic and polarising criminology in 
development, effectively catering for the emerging differing modes of crime 
governance. He talked about the criminology of the self, characterising offenders as 
UDWLRQDOFRQVXPHUVLQYRNHGWRµURXWLQLVHFULPHWRDOOD\GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHIHDUVDQGWR
SURPRWH SUHYHQWLYH DFWLRQ¶73 He contrasted this to the criminology of the other, 
FKDUDFWHULVLQJRIIHQGHUVDVWKHWKUHDWHQLQJRXWFDVWLQYRNHGWRµGHPRQL]HWKHFULPLQDO
WRH[FLWHSRSXODUIHDUVDQGKRVWLOLWLHVDQGWRSURPRWHVXSSRUWIRUVWDWHSXQLVKPHQW¶74 
It is this criminological rhetoric of the other that sits squarely in the neoliberal paradigm 
of zero-tolerance and incapacitation which is embodied in the VPS scheme by 
seemingly bringing the victim physically into the sentencing exercise.  
That said, concerns have been raised as to whether the VPS scheme in fact 
alters the existing system at all. Glyn Maddocks, a founding Trustee and Board Chair 
RIWKH&HQWUHIRU&ULPLQDO$SSHDOVVWDWHGWKDWµDVWKHVFKHPHVHWWOHVGRZQDFRQFHUQ
I have is that this is tokenism. It is about paying lip service to the concerns of victims, 
DQGDWZRUVWFUXHOO\UDLVLQJWKHLUH[SHFWDWLRQV,¶PPLQGIXORIYLFWLPLPSDFWVWDWHPHQWV
and the recent furore over the judge who apparently stated such statements made by 
EHUHDYHGIDPLOLHVPDGH³QRGLIIHUHQFH´¶75 This notion of ineffectiveness reverts to the 
question considered earlier in this chapter of what purpose is being served by this 
reform. As I contend in chapter four, this is a wider question than simply whether the 
VPS impacts the sentencing exercise but rather the impact that the existence of the 
scheme has on the legitimacy of the criminal trial. With this in mind I shall conclude 
this chapter by considering the impact the VPS has had on the liberal trial institution. 
 
4. Much ado about nothing? 
This section will consider the impact the revised VPS scheme has on the latter part of 
the trial institution involving the sentencing of the defendant. To address the question 
                                                          
73
 Garland (n 66) 461. 
74
 Garland (n 66) 461. 
75 Maddocks (n 64). 
67 
 
of whether victims are now being taken into account as a result of changes brought 
about by the revised VPS scheme there are effectively two issues to consider: firstly, 
whether the reform to the VPS scheme has affected sentencing in terms of changing 
any of the fundamental tenets of the sentencing exercise and secondly, whether 
victims feel more listened to in the process, which in turn leads onto the notions to be 
discussed in the final chapter concerning the legitimacy of the trial. I conclude that the 
reform to the VPS scheme has limited impact on the sentencing exercise in court but 
a far greater impact in terms of the basis for legitimacy of the trial process. 
 The two key victim entitlements contained in the Code concerning VPSs are 
firstly the ability to make one, detailing how the crime has affected the victim, and 
secondly the possibility of the victim reading the VPS aloud or having it read aloud on 
their behalf, during the sentencing exercise. On the one hand, in relation to impacting 
on the sentencing exercise, it has been pointed out that neither of these entitlements 
are new initiatives.76 The ability to make a VPS, as earlier considered in this chapter, 
ILUVWHPHUJHGRYHUWZHQW\\HDUVDJRLQWKH9LFWLPV¶&KDUWHUZKLFKZDVWKHQIRUPDOLVHG
in VPS Scheme in 2001. The ability for a victim to read out their VPS in court, although 
not part of the formalised scheme, was a possibility even before it was included in the 
Code. In R v Perkins and Others WKH/RUG&KLHI-XVWLFHVDLGWKDWµWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
these principles [as espoused in Perkins] means that it will be very rare for the victim 
to read out his or her statement, but the process is sufficiently flexible for the Judge to 
SHUPLWLWLQDQDSSURSULDWHFDVH¶77 Yet on the other hand, when considering whether 
the substance of the Code in relation to VPSs is simply a restatement of the status 
quo or purely cosmetic, despite it being billed as a sea change in relation to the 
involvement of the victim in prosecutions, Lyndon Harris postulates that, although 
GHYRLGRIQHZLQLWLDWLYHVWKHSURYLVLRQVDUHµQRWFRVPHWLFWRYLFWLPV7KHYDOXHRIEHLQJ
made WRIHHOLQFOXGHGLVDYLFWRU\LQLWVHOI¶78 The value to the victims is what I shall be 
considering in chapter four when looking at the interaction of these reforms with the 
legitimacy of the trial. For now, in relation to sentencing impact, the salient point is the 
lack of change brought about by the VPS as embedded in the Code compared to the 
situation immediately preceding it.  
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UHYLHZRIWKH936VFKHPHZKLFKIRFXVHGRQµZKHWKHUWKH VPS system achieves its 
DLP RI JLYLQJ YLFWLPV D YRLFH DQG EHLQJ µWDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW¶¶79 The use of market 
research, again, is in itself a typically neoliberal technique of governance according to 
market metrics by increasing engagement with users through the use of surveys. 
Having conducted 44 direct interviews with victims and considered feedback from 241 
PDJLVWUDWHVDQGYLFWLPVWKHUHSRUW¶VRYHUDOOILQGLQJZDVWKDWPRVWFDVHVDWFRXUW
and at parole are finalised without the inclusion of a VPS.80 Its more specific findings 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWZKLOVW µPRVWYLFWLPVYDOXHWKHHQWLWOHPHQWWRPDNHD936«YLFWLPV
are generally not clear about how their VPS makes a difference in their case [although] 
Judges, magistrates and Parole Board members say the VPS is included in their 
assessment of evidence and informs their decision-PDNLQJ¶81 A further report 
FRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWWKHUHLVµQRRYHUDOORZQHUVKLSRIWKH936SURFHVVWRHQVXUHWKDWLW
ZRUNVIURPEHJLQQLQJWRHQG¶82  
The report makes reference to the Crime Survey for England and Wales for the 
year ending March 2015 which indicated that only: 
13 percent of victims recall being given the opportunity to make a VPS. 47 percent of 
victims who were given the opportunity to make a VPS actually went ahead and made 
one. 37 percent wanted their VPS to be read out loud and 65 percent of victims who 
made a VPS felt that it was taken into account by the criminal justice system.83 
Given the positive rhetoric surrounding the inclusion of the VPS scheme in the revised 
Code, including the provision of a statutory footing, an increase in availability and 
usage of the scheme might be anticipated. Yet when comparing these statistics with 
WKHILQGLQJVRI5REHUWVDQG0DQLNLV¶VSUHYLRXVO\UHIHUHQFHG5HSRUW84 which analysed 
data from the national quarterly Witness and Victim Experience Surveys conducted 
between 2007/8 and 2009/10 (three years before the overhaul of the scheme), there 
is a massive drop in those who remember being offered the opportunity to make a 
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VPS (from 42 percent pre-inclusion in the Code to 13 percent post-inclusion) with a 
smaller fall in uptake for completing a VPS (55 percent pre-inclusion compared to 47 
percent post-inclusion). Interestingly, however, there is a considerable increase in the 
number of victims who felt that their VPS was taken into account (from 39 percent pre-
inclusion to 65 percent post-inclusion). Even taking into account the usual precautions 
when considering statistical data, it is my contention that the suggested fall in VPSs 
being offered to victims of crime despite the public drive and measures taken to give 
YLFWLP¶VDYRLFHLQSURFHHGLQJVLVLQGLFDWLYHRIDODFNRILPSDFWRIWKHVFKHPHRQWKH
fundamental tenets of the sentencing exercise. Yet the large increase in feelings of 
participation and worth by those victims who made a statement indicates a value to 
the scheme beyond its practical input which I contend can be accounted for when 




In conclusion, the VPS scheme privileges the victim of crime by enabling them to 
provide a statement specifically detailing how the criminal conduct on trial has affected 
them. This statement can be heard at the sentencing of a defendant, and indeed the 
victim has the right to read out the statement themselves in court should they wish to 
do so. The sentencing exercise in recent times has focused on the defendant, 
exhibiting the typical liberal values of the sanctioning of punishment by the state in a 
fair process and yet the VPS scheme embodies neoliberal paradigms such as 
individualisation towards the victim, responsibilisation of the victim and personalisation 
through consumerist ideals. Despite this increased emphasis towards the victim, the 
mechanics of the sentencing exercise seem little affected by the scheme. What is 
DIIHFWHG LV WKH YLFWLP¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI EHLQJ LQYROYHG LQ WKH SURFHVV DQG WKHLU
subsequent satisfaction. It is my contention that rather than necessarily impacting the 
criminal process, both the VPS and the VRRS have changed how the process is 
OHJLWLPLVHGEDVHGRQWHQHWVRISURFHGXUDOMXVWLFHIURPWKHYLFWLP¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGWKH
dualistic nature of the evolving dialogue between the victim as audience and the state 
as power holders. I consider the concept of legitimacy in chapter four, starting with 
neoliberal paradigms of legitimacy involving the prominence of the market and 
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economic growth as well as governance through crime, which fail to wholly account 
for the recent victim-centric reforms. I move on to the more liberal conception of 
legitimacy involving the expansion or shift in the original sense of the audience or 
interested party under procedural conceptions which illustrates the dialogic and 
relational nature of these reforms and the legitimacy of the criminal trial.  
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Chapter IV. Legitimacy of the trial institution 
In chapters two and three of this thesis I have contended that, despite the view of 
scholars like Brown, who suggest that neoliberal tendencies undermine liberal public 
institutions, victim-centric reforms to the criminal trial in the UK have limited impact on 
the liberal conception of the criminal trial. I have argued that after these victim-centric 
reforms the trial is still fundamentally a liberal institution, providing condemnation and 
punishment for those who break the criminal law in a process which is fair to both the 
prosecution and the defence.1 In this chapter I conclude my study of these reforms by 
suggesting that what is changing is how the process is legitimised. It is my contention 
that by bringing the victim into the process at key decision-making points that were 
previously remote to them, such as the decision whether to prosecute and the decision 
on how to punish the offender, the victim-centric reforms under analysis enhance the 
YLFWLP¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI SURFHGXUDO IDLUQHVV WR WKHPVHOYHV LQ WKH WULDO SURFHVV DQG
provide an opportunity for the victim to engage in a dialogue with those in authority. 
This in effect expands the audience to increased aspects of the trial process, which in 
turn strengthens the legitimacy of the trial institution, by more overtly recognising the 
role of the victim in the criminal justice system, even if that role changes little of 
substance on a procedural level.  
I shall start this chapter by considering two neoliberal paradigms of legitimacy, 
in order to identify their deficiency in conceptualising the criminal trial. First, Wendy 
%URZQ¶VZHOO-known approach in Undoing the Demos, which points to the market ² or 
balance sheet ² centric nature of neoliberal legitimacy. %URZQ¶VIUDPLQJ,VXJJHVW
cannot adequately handle the particularities of the legitimation of the criminal trial 
which has a more complicated set of imperatives. Second, and similarly, Paul A. 
3DVVDYDQW¶V argument that a neoliberal state governs through a criminal-consumer 
double, resulting in justice becoming the hard limit of a softer, consumer-driven 
society, also fails to sufficiently account for the victim-centric reforms. I shall instead 
consider how liberal conceptions of the legitimacy of the trial have been formulated, 
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making particular reference to the work of Tom Tyler and then Anthony Bottoms & 
Justice Tankebe, with a focus on the concept of procedural justice. I shall conclude by 
considering that, despite the neoliberal imperatives embodied in the victim-centric 
reforms, analyses of legitimation in terms of neoliberalism, although playing a textual 
role, do little to augment our understanding of the criminal trial. It is in fact liberal 
accounts of the conceptions of trial legitimacy that remain more explanatory in 
understanding trial legitimation through an expansion or shift in the original sense of 
the audience or interested party under procedural conceptions.  
  




FRQVXPHU GRXEOH %URZQ¶V IRFXV IRU WKH FRQFHSW RI OHJLWLPDF\ UHVWV XSRQ WKH
legitimisation of the state in general terms, with no specific consideration of the 
criminal trial. Consequently her arguments are not altogether helpful in understanding 
the legitimacy of the criminal trial in light of the victim-centric reforms, but her paradigm 
concerning the market-centricity of the legitimacy of the state linked to economic 
growth and entrepreneurialism is useful so I shall firstly consider how she frames the 
concepts of legitimacy and legitimation. Secondly, I shall consider why she does not 
tackle the legitimacy of the criminal trial and thirdly, I shall draw upon some useful 
aspects of her paradigm. I then turn to Passavant whose work on the positioning of 
criminal law as the hard limit to a softening state is more relatable to the criminal trial 
WKDQ %URZQ¶V DQDO\VLV DQG VR FRQVHTXHQWO\ PRUH KHOSIXO ZKHQ FRQVLGHULQJ WKH
OHJLWLPDF\RI WKHFULPLQDO WULDO)LUVWO\ , VKDOO FRQVLGHU3DVVDYDQW¶V IUDPLQJRIVtate 
legitimacy as being strengthened by the empowerment of non-state actors. Secondly 
I shall consider his paradigm of governance through a criminal-consumer double 
encompassing a zero-tolerance of crime and a logic of consumerism. Although more 
relatable WRWKHFULPLQDOWULDO3DVVDYDQW¶VQHROLEHUDOIUDPLQJRIOHJLWLPDF\LQVLPLODULW\
to Brown, cannot fully handle the criminal trial and the impact of the victim-centric 
reforms on its legitimacy. Consequently, having highlighted the limited usefulness of 
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the concepts of neoliberal legitimacy, I will move on to consider liberal framings of 
legitimacy. 
 
i. Brown ± abatement of liberal concerns of justice  
$FFRUGLQJWR%URZQµHFRQRPLFJURZWKKDVEHFRPHERWKWKHHQGDQGOHJLWLPDWLRQRI
JRYHUQPHQW¶2 resulting in fundamentally identical conduct of both government and 
firms, with social responsibility attracting consumers and investors. Her critique is that 
QHROLEHUDOLVP¶V FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI SHUVRQV DQG VWDWHV DV HQWHUSULVHV LV HURGLQJ
democratic institutions. For Brown, neoliberal reason dictates that a state would lose 
its legitimacy should it fail to pursue the neoliberal ideology of conducting itself in ways 
that maximise its capital value through entrepreneurialism and investment.3 As a 
consequence of this neoliberal reason, political ends are replaced by economic ones 
and a range of concerns, including justice, either recede, become subsumed or are 
radically transformed as they become economised in a project of capital 
enhancement.4 Brown further considers the ramifications for justice in the context of 
the neoliberal vanquishing of homo politicus by the ascendancy of homo oeconomicus, 
ZLWKKXPDQEHLQJVEHLQJILJXUHGDVKXPDQFDSLWDOLQWKDWµOLEHUDOGHPRFUDWLFMXVWLFH
FRQFHUQV UHFHGH « >DV WKH@ « OHJLWLPDF\ DQG task of the state becomes bound 
H[FOXVLYHO\WRHFRQRPLFJURZWK¶5 with the pursuit of justice limited to the advancement 
of economic purposes.  
 Yet Brown remains vague as to what she means by the state and vaguer still in 
her consideration of the concept of justice, with no specific mention of crime or the 
criminal trial. Brown consistently talks of the state as a whole, or its institutions in 
general, rather than focusing on specific institutions. For example, when considering 
the responsibilisation of the state, conforming to the veridiction of the market, she 
HQGRUVHV )RXFDXOW¶V WKRXJKWV WKDW µHFRQRPLF PHWULFV JRYHUQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG
SUDFWLFHVRIWKHVWDWHDQGWKHVWDWHLWVHOILVOHJLWLPLVHGE\HFRQRPLFJURZWK¶6 Such a 
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 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos (Zone Books 2015) 26. 
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 Wendy Brown (n 2) 22. 
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 Wendy Brown (n 2) 22. 
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 Wendy Brown (n 2) 40. 
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Collège de France 1978-1979 (Graham Burchell tr, Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 47. 
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high level of generality in relation to the state and its institutions does little to account 
for the particularities of the criminal trial.  
In relation to matters of justice, Brown makes passing reference to the demise 
of juridical sovereignty. She considers that the state has been remodelled in the image 
of the firm, following the citizen-VXEMHFW¶V FRQYHUWLRQ IURP homo politicus to an 
economic being, homo oeconomicus, and neoliberalism economising all spheres of 
OLIH7KLVVKHVXJJHVWVUHVXOWV LQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDW WKHVWDWH µJDLn[s] or lose[s] 
OHJLWLPDF\ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH PDUNHW¶V YLFLVVLWXGHV¶7 Foucault characterised homo 
oeconomicus as a subject of interest and identified the problem of whether the subject 
of interest is capable of being connected to the juridical will.8 Foucault concluded that 
µLQWHUHVWFRQVWLWXWHVVRPHWKLQJLUUHGXFLEOHLQUHODWLRQWRWKHMXULGLFDOZLOO«>DQG@«WKH
VXEMHFWRIULJKWDQGWKHVXEMHFWRILQWHUHVWDUHQRWJRYHUQHGE\WKHVDPHORJLF¶9 The 
challenge for the criminal trial, therefore, which relies on the common concern with 
justice, is how to garner the participation and support of the subject of interest who is 
OLEHUDWHGIURPDOOFRQFHUQVZLWKWKHVRFLDORUWKHFROOHFWLYH$V)RXFDXOWDYHUUHGµWKH
market and the [social] contract function in exactly opposite ways and we have in fact 
WZRKHWHURJHQHRXVVWUXFWXUHV¶10 Whilst not specifically talking about the criminal trial, 
%URZQ¶VIUDPLQJRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHVWDWHDQGLQGLYLGXDODFWRUVLQSXUHO\HFRQRPLF
terms cannot handle the juridical imperatives which continue to underlie criminal 
proceedings.  
 %URZQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHULVHRIVWDWHOHJLWLPDF\EDVHGRQHFRQRPLFJURZWK
and entrepreneurial attributes can be of some use, however, when considering the 
challenges faced by the criminal justice system in engaging victims and witnesses 
whose own interests are deemed to focus on self-entrepreneurialism. As Trent H. 
Hamann explained, homo oeconomicus LVµIXOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUQDYLJDWLQJWKHVRFLDO
realm using rational choice and cost-benefit calculation to the express exclusion of all 
other values and interests. Those who fail to thrive under such social conditions have 
QRRQHDQGQRWKLQJWREODPHEXWWKHPVHOYHV¶11 If citizens are expected to act as self-
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 Michel Foucault (n 8) 276. 
11
 Trent H. Hamann, µNeoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics¶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entrepreneurs, taking responsibility for themselves in all other aspects of their lives, it 
is understandable that, when finding themselves as a victim of crime, they would 
expect to take a more active role in the prosecution of those who have wronged them, 
rather than simply being the trigger for a process in which they play no other role other 
than as a potential witness. It is this more active involvement of the victim and its 
impact on the legitimacy of the trial that I consider in part III of this chapter below. I 
VKDOOQRZFRQVLGHUZK\3DVVDYDQW¶VDrguments concerning the interaction between 
the neoliberal state and crime similarly cannot fully account for the victim-centric 
reforms addressed by this study.  
  
ii. Passavant ± governance through a criminal-consumer double 
,WXUQQRZWR3DVVDYDQW¶Vwork on crime, consumption and governance in which he 
FRQVLGHUHGWKDWQHROLEHUDOFRQGLWLRQVKDYHUHVXOWHGLQJRYHUQDQFHµWKURXJKDFULPLQDO-
FRQVXPHU GRXEOH¶12 By making specific reference to crime as a factor in state 
OHJLWLPDF\UDWKHUWKDQ%URZQ¶VPRUHJeneralised legitimisation of the State, it is helpful 
WRGUDZSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQ3DVVDYDQW¶VWKRXJKWVRQVWDWHOHJLWLPDF\DQGWKHIRFXVRI
WKLVZRUNZKLFKLVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHFULPLQDOWULDO,ILUVWFRQVLGHU3DVVDYDQW¶VVWDQFH
that the neoliberal empowerment of non-state actors in roles traditionally conducted 
by agents of the state (such as crime control) actually strengthens the neoliberal 
VWDWH¶VOHJLWLPDF\UDWKHUWKDQZHDNHQLQJLW$SDUDOOHO,VXJJHVWFDQEHGUDZQZLWKWKH
FULPLQDOWULDO¶VOHJLWimacy. Secondly, I consider his conclusion that the neoliberal state 
governs through a criminal-consumer double whereby zero-tolerance of crime and the 
logic of consumerism underpin state legitimacy, in order to understand the interaction 
between crime and consumerism on the issue of legitimacy.  
Passavant described how the neoliberal state governs at a distance by 
activating action by non-state organisations, but he conceded that in so doing, rather 
WKDQ EHLQJ ZHDNHQHG WKH QHROLEHUDO VWDWH KDV µHQKDQFHG Dnd extended its formal 
FDSDFLWLHV¶E\PDNLQJDOOLDQFHVZLWKQHZRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGDFWLYDWLQJJRYHUQPHQWDO
powers of non-state actors.13 %\ ZD\ RI H[DPSOH KH FLWHV 'DYLG *DUODQG¶V ZRUN
                                                          
12
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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HDUOLHUFRQVLGHUHGLQFKDSWHUWKUHHFRQFHUQLQJWKHQHROLEHUDOVWDWH¶Vefforts to control 
crime by enlisting non-state actors, noting that although such crime control practices 
DUH LQIRUPDO LQQDWXUH WKH\DUH OLQNHGXSWRWKHµPRUHIRUPDODFWLYLWLHVRI WKHSROLFH
WKHPVHOYHV¶14 WKXVFRPSOHPHQWLQJDQGH[WHQGLQJµWKHIRUPDOFRQWrols of the criminal 
MXVWLFHVWDWH¶15 I contend that this is helpful in reinforcing the neoliberal nature of the 
victim-centric reforms as considered in chapters two and three, whereby non-state 
actors, in particular victims of crime, are being enlisted to participate in the criminal 
justice system at stages which traditionally did not garner their involvement, such as 
the decision whether to prosecute and the sentencing exercise post-conviction. It also 
goes some way to understanding how the empowerment of non-state actors, such as 
victims, can strengthen the legitimacy of a process such as the criminal trial, rather 
than weaken it. It does little, however, to understand why these governmental reforms, 
reflecting neoliberal imperatives, have such limited impact on the liberal nature of the 
trial itself and therefore to comprehend what purpose these reforms serve in 
legitimising the essentially enduring liberal institution of the criminal trial. 
 3DVVDYDQWUHOLHGXSRQ3DW2¶0DOOH\¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHWZRVLGHVof neoliberalism 
(as earlier considered in chapter three), being the consumerist soft side and the 
criminological hard side, to conclude that the neoliberal state is neither weak nor 
small.16 The notion that justice becomes the hard limit of a purportedly softening state 
ZKHUHE\ WKH ULVNV SRVHGE\ FULPLQDO µPRQVWHUV¶ DUH GHHPHG WREH LQWROHUDEOHE\ D
consumer-GULYHQVRFLHW\IRXQGV3DVVDYDQW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWDQHROLEHUDOVWDWHµJRYHUQV
WKURXJKFULPH¶17 as evidenced by a number of measures indicating a zero-tolerance 
mentality.18 This, he avers, manifests itself in a shift in priority from prosecution of 
crimes in court to crime prevention.19 Whilst this may be so, the focus of the victim-
centric reforms rests upon the prosecution of offences, although arguably the 
successful prosecution of criminals could act as a deterrence for the commission of 
RIIHQFHV3HUKDSVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ3DVVDYDQW¶VYLHZDQGWKDWRIWKLVWKHVLVLV
WKDWKHVHHPV LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH µRXWZDUG-IDFLQJ¶ function of the court, whereas this 
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VWXG\ LV LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH FRXUW  WULDO¶V nature or quality in itself? The consumerist 
paradigm can, again, assist in understanding the reforms as neoliberal in nature, as 
FRQVLGHUHGLQFKDSWHUWZREXWLIP\DQDO\VLVLVFRJHQWWKHQ3DVVDYDQW¶VIUDPHZRUk 
does not help to address the impact of the reforms on the legitimacy of the trial, given 
that it essentially maintains its liberal nature despite them. 
When considering the absence of an impact on the liberal nature of the trial by 
the neoliberal victim-FHQWULF UHIRUPV DQG XVLQJ 3DVVDYDQW¶V PRGHO RI D FULPLQDO-
consumer double as an exemplar for neoliberal legitimacy, it is easy to dismiss the 
reforms as a mere exercise in public relations, designed to appeal to the victim as 
consumer by dressing up existing rights as new, enhanced consumer-rights designed 
to ease the incapacitation of criminal monsters. Indeed, whilst considering the Code, 
which as detailed in chapter three contains the provisions relating to the VPS, Lyndon 
+DUULVVWDWHGWKDWµ,Ithe Code means that more victims are aware of their entitlements, 
and the agencies are aware of their obligations, does it matter that it is something of 
D35H[HUFLVH"¶20 To view the victim-centric reforms as public relations exercises in a 
consumer-led society, particularly in light of my contentions that they do little to change 
the liberal nature of the trial, without reconsidering the liberal legitimacy of the trial, 
would miss what I contend is the actual impact these reforms have on the legitimacy 
of the criminal trial. It is precisely who these reforms are aimed at, or in other words 
the audience being addressed, and the stage in the proceedings at which that 
audience is engaged, that necessitate a reconsideration of the liberal framing of the 
legitimacy of the criminal trial.  
To fully understand this impact I shall now consider how liberal conceptions of 
the legitimacy of the trial have been formulated and then explore how these have been 
expanded as a result of the neoliberal reforms.                         
 
2. Liberal conceptions of the legitimacy of the trial 
The two neoliberal notions of legitimacy considered above, based firstly on market or 
balance-sheet imperatives and secondly on justice becoming the hard limit of a softer, 
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consumer-driven society, assist in reinforcing the neoliberal nature of the victim-centric 
reforms. They fail, however, to account for the legitimacy of the criminal trial in light of 
the current direction of its reform. In the next part of this chapter I turn, therefore, to 
consider two liberal notions concerning the legitimacy of the trial, involving firstly the 
concept of procedural justice and secondly the more dialogic and relational character 
of legitimacy. I shall then conclude this chapter by using these liberal accounts of the 
conceptions of trial legitimacy to explore how the victim-centric reforms have led to an 
expansion or shift in the original sense of the audience or interested party within the 
process of the legitimation of the criminal trial.  
 
i. Legitimacy based on the notion of procedural justice 
In his critique of deterrence as a model for securing compliance with the law and 
approbation of a self-UHJXODWRU\DSSURDFKµIRFXVVLQJRQHQJDJLQJSHRSOH
VYDOXHVDV
a basis for motivating voluntDU\GHIHUHQFHWRWKHODZ¶21 Tom Tyler defined legitimacy 
DVµWKHSURSHUW\WKDWDUXOHRUDQDXWKRULW\KDVZKHQRWKHUVIHHOREOLJDWHGWRYROXQWDULO\
defer to that rule or authority. In other words, a legitimate authority is one that is 
regarded by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed 
E\RWKHUV¶22 Clearly the criminal trial relies upon such deference both in relation to 
participation in the proceedings and acceptance of the trial outcome. Tyler talked 
about legitimacy as a quality that leads others to defer to the legitimate actor rather 
than pursue their own self-interest.23 7KLVQRWLRQRIUHOLQTXLVKLQJRQH¶VRZQLQWHUHVWV
IRUWKHFRPPRQJRRGGLUHFWO\FRQIOLFWVZLWK%URZQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHGHPLVH
of citizenship concerned with the public good due to KRPRRHFRQRPLFXV¶V approach 
to everything in market terms,24 as considered above. It is my contention that these 
opposing interests can help to understand the reframing of the concept of legitimacy 
through the victim-centriF UHIRUPV FRQVLGHUHG EHORZ )RU 7\OHU LW LV µZLGHVSUHDG
YROXQWDU\FRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKHODZDQGOHJDODXWKRULWLHV¶WKDWDOORZVWKHDXWKRULWLHVWR
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divert their resources away from the provision of incentives to encourage the 
maintenance of order, towards other aspects of the system in need of investment.25 
For an adversarial criminal justice system that relies so heavily upon the cooperation 
of victims and witnesses to prosecute those accused of criminality, this voluntary 
cooperation is an essential aspect of its legitimacy.  
Tyler embarked on a study to provide empirical support for an alternative to the 
deterrence-led model of legitimacy based instead on the consent and cooperation of 
the public.26 The main findings of the study were threefold: firstly, in relation to shaping 
compliance with the law through legitimacy, the findings indicated that legitimacy 
trumped considerations of deterrence as motivation for compliance with the law; 
secondly, that the basis of that legitimacy was embedded in procedural fairness rather 
than the favourability or fairness of the decisions reached by those in authority; lastly, 
that procedural justice meant more than an instrumental interpretation based on the 
RSSRUWXQLW\EHLQJSURYLGHGWRVWDWHRQH¶VFDVHSULRUWRDGHFLVLRQpermitting indirect 
control over the proceedings, but rather a non-instrumental meaning could be 
attributed based on the opportunity to speak to the authorities, regardless of whether 
such dialogue would influence the outcome.27 7RP7\OHU¶VVXUYH\VOHGKLPto conclude 
WKDW µLWZDVWKHSHUFHLYHGSURFHGXUDOIDLUQHVVRI ODZHQIRUFHPHQWDXWKRULWLHVUDWKHU
WKDQ WKH IDYRXUDELOLW\ RU WKH SHUFHLYHG IDLUQHVV RI WKH RXWFRPH RI WKH FLWL]HQ¶V




and authorities.29 Christian Reus-Smit further advocated thaW µOHJLWLPDWH DFWRUV RU
institutions can draw upon, or be sustained by, wellsprings of voluntarism that 
encourage active support, simple compliance, and lower levels of opposition, reducing 
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WKH FRVWV RI FRHUFLRQ DQG EULEHU\¶30 Such voluntarism provides stability but, more 
pertinently for the criminal trial, it provokes the requisite cooperation that is not in the 
nature of homo oeconomicus. The victim-centric reforms can be seen as a garnering 
RIWKHYLFWLP¶VVXSSRUWE\HQKDQFLQJWKHOHJLWLPDF\IRUWKHFULPinal trial system through 
the paradigm of procedural justice, whereby the victim has the opportunity to express 
their chagrin of a prosecutorial decision or elucidate the impact of the offence upon 
them at sentencing. The favourability to the victim of the outcome of the proceedings, 
according to procedural justice imperatives, is of little import compared to the fact that 
they could make themselves heard. It is that support which will sustain the effective 
working of the criminal justice system through active participation by the victim in the 
reporting of offences and attendance at trial as a witness when required. 
Yet the one-sided nature of procedural justice which relies little upon the 
dialogue between the authority and the citizen, little on the outcome, but more on the 
fact that the procedures are fair in reaching that outcome, still cannot fully account for 
the victim-centric reforms. The relationship between the authority and the citizen 
needs further explanation, as considered in the next part of this chapter.  
  
ii. Dialogic and relational nature of legitimacy 
Bottoms and Tankebe, in their consideration of the concept of legitimacy in criminal 
justice, noted that in recent years criminological analysis had appreciated the growing 
importance of the question of legitimacy, particularly in relation to policing and to 
prisons.31 Yet the aim of their work was to enhance the conceptual understanding of 
legitimacy. It was their contention that the concept had not been adequately theorised, 
especially in relDWLRQ WR LWV µGLDORJLF DQG UHODWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU¶32 It is this dual and 
interactive aspect of legitimacy, characterising the relationship between those with 
power and those who submit to that power, that I seek to employ when understanding 
the impact of the victim-centric reforms on the legitimacy of the criminal trial. I shall 
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explore their concept of legitimacy before employing it to understand the impact of the 
victim-centric reforms on the legitimacy of the trial process. 
 Bottoms and Tankebe noted that the dominant theoretical approach to the study 
RIOHJLWLPDF\ZDVEDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWRIµSURFHGXUDOMXVWLFH¶DVHVSRXVHGE\7\OHU
and already considered above. Whilst highly complimentary of this amassed body of 
work, Bottoms and Tankebe supported David SPLWK¶V DVVHUWLRQV WKDW µSURFHGXUDO
MXVWLFH>UHVHDUFK@ZRUNDOWKRXJKSRZHUIXOLVOLPLWHGLQVFRSH¶DQGWKDWLWZDVWKHUHIRUH
QHFHVVDU\ WR WDNH µDZLGHUYLHZRIWKH LVVXHV¶33 Rather than defining legitimacy by 
focussing on the belief of the citizen that they must follow the decision or rules of an 
DXWKRULW\WKH\SUHIHUUHGWKHµULJKWWRUXOH¶DSSURDFKEDVHGRQµZKHWKHUDSRZHU-holder 
is justified in claiming the right to hold power over other citizens (and thus to issue 
decisions and rules that are binding RQWKHP¶34 Bottoms and Tankebe relied on the 
ZRUNVRI-RVSHK5D]DQG0D[:HEHUWREHWWHUGHILQHOHJLWLPDF\,Q5D]¶VDQDO\VLVRI
claims to legitimacy he suggested that effective power can be subdivided between 
three groups: (1) people or groups who exert naked power, (2) de facto authorities, 
DQGOHJLWLPDWHDXWKRULWLHV7KHWKLUGJURXS¶VFODLPWROHJLWLPDF\LVDFFHSWHGWKXV
they are recognised as having a right to govern.35 The emphasis for Weber was on 
the cultivation of legitimacy in that claims to legitimacy by political power-holders are 
empirically universal, and they are also ongoing (power-KROGHUVDWWHPSWµWRHVWDEOLVK
DQG WRFXOWLYDWH¶ OHJLWLPDF\RQDFRQWLQXLQJEDVLV36 Taking into account these two 
positions Bottoms and Tankebe concluded that:  
legitimacy needs to be perceived as always dialogic and relational in character. That 
is to say, those in power (or seeking power) in a given context make a claim to be the 
legitimate ruler(s); then members of the audience respond to this claim; the power-
KROGHUPLJKWDGMXVWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFODLPLQOLJKWRIWKHDXGLHQFH¶VUHVSRQVHDQGWKLV
process repeats itself. It follows that legitimacy should not be viewed as a single 
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transaction; it is more like a perpetual discussion, in which the content of power-
KROGHUV¶ODWHUFODLPVZLOOEHDIIHFWHGE\WKHQDWXUHRIWKHDXGLHQFHUHVSRQVH37 
Bottoms and Tankebe are effectively extolling the concept of legitimacy as a two-
sided, evolving process whereby the power holder modifies their practices in response 
to the audience in order to maintain their legitimacy, as opposed to the more one-sided 
approach averred by the concept of procedural justice whereby the power holder 
maintains their legitimacy whilst the process is deemed to be fair by the audience. The 
idea of legitimacy being based on a dialogue between the power holder and the 
audience with an ongoing process of refinement is one that can be used to understand 
the relationship between the victim-centric reforms and the criminal trial, as I shall now 
consider. This approach exemplifies liberal conceptions of legitimacy such as working 
together for the shared interest of the common good rather than the neoliberal 
conceptions earlier considered in this chapter of self-interest and the promotion of 
consumerist ideDOV , VKDOO XVH 1LOV &KULVWLH¶V ZRUN WR LOOXVWUDWH WKH LVVXHV IURP D
criminal justice perspective looking first at the bringing of prosecutions and then at the 
sentencing of offenders. 
 
3. The expansion or shifting of the audience to legitimate the trial process 
Taking the concept of legitimacy as an ongoing discussion that is both relational and 
dialogic, as advocated by Bottoms and Tankebe above, I am going to conclude this 
chapter by considering how the legitimacy of the trial can be understood as 
strengthened in light of the victim-centric reforms considered in chapters two and 
three, which expand the audience at key stages of the execution of power in the 
criminal trial, responding to the need of the victim to be more involved in the 
proceedings. I shall start by looking at the earlier stage of the criminal trial process 
when the decision whether to prosecute a suspect is taken and finish with the later 
stage of the criminal trial process when an offender is sentenced. In so doing I shall 
rely on ChristLH¶VDUWLFOHRQFRQIOLFWVDVSURSHUW\LQZKLFKKHFODLPHGWKDWYLFWLPV
of crime had lost their right to participate in the ensuing conflict to the state and he 
DGYRFDWHGDSURFHGXUHWRUHVWRUHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ULJKWVLQWKHLURZQFRQIOLFW38 By tracing 
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the involvement of the victim in criminal proceedings from instigator to partial 
participant, I shall illustrate the evolving nature of the discussion between the state as 
power-holder and the victim as audience, demonstrating that the recent victim-centric 
UHIRUPVFDQEHVHHQDVWKHQH[WHYROXWLRQLQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSLQFUHDVLQJWKHYLFWLP¶V
opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the power-holder and thus increasing the 
legitimacy of the trial system. 
 
i. The bringing of prosecutions  
When proposing a court system to restore the rights of victims of crime to participate 
in their own conflicts, Christie argued that property in criminal conflicts had been taken 
away from one of the parties directly involved in the conflict, namely the victim, and 
vested in the State.39 He described the reasoning behind this transfer in ownership as 
emanating from both honourable and dishonourable motives.40 Whilst the prevention 
of private vengeance and vendettas continue to provide worthy justification for the 
6WDWH¶V LQWHUYHQtion in criminal conflicts, supporting a need to reduce conflict and 
protect both the victim and indeed the defendant; the less principled financial 
motivations of the State profiting from its representation of the victim by receiving 
money or property from the offender are no longer relevant considerations.  
In the English criminal justice system the evolution of the bringing of 
prosecutions can be traced from pre-1880 when victims or their own lawyers 
presented the case against the accused, changing to the police having the 
responsibility for most prosecutions41 until this responsibility was taken over by the 
newly created CPS42 as earlier considered in chapters one and two. Looking at this 
evolving process, it is evident that with each alteration the victim is further removed 
from the process. The direct involvement of the victim as prosecutor took a step back 
when the police took over the role, although I would suggest that there was still a 
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 Christie (n 38) 3. 
41
 Prosecution of Offences Act 1879. In the history of the CPS as described on their own website, the 
first Director of Public Prosecutions was created to take the decision to prosecute in only a small 
number of important or difficult cases. The prosecution of those cases was then taken over by the 
Treasury Solicitor. Otherwise the police prosecuted most cases until 1986. CPS website 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/about/history.html> accessed 3 November 2016. 
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relationship between the victim and the prosecutor since the police would be 
investigating the offence also and thus interacting with the victim. The creation of the 
CPS resulted in a second step back on the part of the victim with a new layer of more 
unapproachable bureaucracy separating the victim from the proceedings since the 
victim would still be interacting with the police as investigators but not with the CPS as 
prosecutors.  
The justification for removing the prosecution of the offender from the victim 
and giving the power to the police surely stemmed from the need to legitimise the trial 
proceedings, regularising the process and reducing the risk of private vengeance. 
Similarly the creation of the CPS stemmed from the need to legitimise a system which 
ZDVFULWLFLVHGLQWKH5R\DO&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUWLQEDVHG on the unreliability of 
police officers who investigated an offence making a fair decision on whether to 
prosecute the alleged offender.43 Arguably the consequence of this removal in a 
YLFWLP¶V RZQHUVKLS RI D GLVSXWH KDV UHVXOWHG LQ WKHLU GHQLDO WR WKH ULJht of full 
participation in the conflict and has led to the victim dissatisfaction in the system as 
detailed in chapter two. It is this participation that is seemingly rebalanced by the 
VRRS. By introducing a formal process for victims to strike up a dialogue with the CPS 
ZKHQWKHGHFLVLRQKDVEHHQWDNHQQRWWRSURVHFXWHDVXVSHFWWKHYLFWLP¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
LQWKHSURVHFXWRULDOSURFHVVLVHQULFKHG7KLVLQWXUQIROORZLQJ%RWWRPDQG7DQNHEH¶V
stance on legitimacy as an ongoing discussion as described above, strengthens the 
legitimacy of the proceedings through the power-holder (CPS) adjusting the process 
to create a dialogue with, and a relationship to, the audience (victim) at a point in the 
proceedings which were previously remote to them. In effect, a role is being returned 
to the victim in the name of legitimacy which was previously removed from them for 
the same reason. The role is lessened since, as already considered in chapter two, 
the VRRS simply provides a formal procedure to seek a review of a terminatory 
decision rather than having a say in the bringing of the prosecution itself but the 
opening of a dialogue at this stage in the proceedings, and the fostering of a 
relationship between the CPS as power holder and the victim as audience indicates 
an expansion of the liberal claim to legitimacy. In effect, this situation retains the 
centralised power of the prosecutorial state, but offers something to the victim too. 
Essentially both aspects of legitimacy get to function in tandem. Whether this formal 
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or technical inclusion of the victim is enough will be considered at the end of this 
chapter. 
Having considered the decision to prosecute I shall conclude by considering 
the sentencing of the offender. 
 
ii. The sentencing of offenders 
The VPS can be considered in similar terms. Christie describes how a number of 
losses flow from taking the ownership of conflicts away from victims, for both the victim, 
society in general and indeed the defendant too.44 One such loss is expounded as the 
loss of personalised encounters between the victim and the defendant in that the victim 
LV µVR WRWDOO\ RXW RI WKH FDVH WKDW KH KDV QR FKDQFH HYHU WR FRPH WR NQRZ WKH
RIIHQGHU¶45 In the English criminal trial, after providing an initial witness statement to 
the police at the start of their investigation, the only direct involvement of the victim in 
the trial process will be in the giving of evidence as a witness for the prosecution 
followed by their cross examination by the defence. Should there be a guilty plea, even 
this involvement will be taken away from the victim, with the sentencing exercise being 
based on the summary of the evidence provided by the prosecutor only. This lack of 
contact with the defendant on the part of the victim, according to Christie, manifests 
itself in feelings of isolation and anger, leaving the victim with a need for understanding 
that is not resolved.46 
According to Christie this loss of personalised encounter also impacts on the 
defendant. Although direct victim participation can be a painful experience for the 
defendant, he avers that the opportunity to discuss the reasons for the offending 
behaviour and the losses sustained by the victim with a view to restitution on the part 
of the defendant, can be equally beneficial for both the victim and the defendant, 
particularly in making the defendant a participant in how he can make good his 
wrongs.47 Effectively Christie is extolling the potential virtues of personal 
confrontations between victims and defendants in terms of reducing recidivism but 
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even he accepts that should such an approach have no such impact it is preferable to 
µUHDFWWRFULPHDFFRUGLQJWRZKDWFORVHO\LQYROYHGSDUWLHVILQGLVMXVWDQGLQDFFRUGDQFH
ZLWKJHQHUDOYDOXHVLQVRFLHW\¶48 WKDQQRW,QRWKHUZRUGVDOWKRXJK&KULVWLH¶VIRFXVLV
on the reduction of recidivism, he recognises that the opportunity for a personal 
encounter between victim and offender can be deemed as just, which is arguably 
indicative of a legitimate process. With the state taking ownership of the punishment 
of offenders and the sentencing exercise being carried out with a focus on the 
RIIHQGHU¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHYLFWLPQHHGQRWEHSUHVHQWDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\IRUDQ\
form of encounter is non-existent.  
The VPS scheme can be seen as a move towards the sort of personal 
encounter envisaged by Christie, especially in providing the victim with the opportunity 
to read out their statement in front of the defendant in court. It does not create the 
direct dialogue envisioned by Christie but by physically bringing the victim into the 
sentencing process, opening up another point of dialogue between the power-holder 
and the victim as audience, the scheme does impact on victims. For victims the 
opportunity to face the defendant whilst expressing the impact of the offence on their 
lives provides the chance of a personalised encounter focussed not on the 
determination of guilt but on the resolution of the matter, albeit a rather one sided 
encounter. Similarly, should the victim provide a VPS without wishing to attend the 
sentencing exercise, they do so in the knowledge that their words will be considered 
by the sentencer, enhancing their relationship to the process through a form of 
GLDORJXH 7KLV DJDLQ IROORZLQJ %RWWRP DQG 7DQNHEH¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI OHJLWLPDF\ DV
earlier considered, strengthens the legitimacy of the proceedings by adjusting the 
VHQWHQFLQJ SURFHVV WR EHWWHU DFFRPPRGDWH WKH YLFWLP¶V QHHGV WR FRQIURQW WKH
defendant and participate in the process at a point in the proceedings which were 
previously remote to them. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, whereas in chapters two and three I established that the neoliberal, 
victim-centric reforms under analysis have a limited impact on the liberal conception 
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of the criminal trial, in this chapter I have suggested that these reforms are best 
XQGHUVWRRGDVFRQWULEXWLQJWRDOLEHUDOFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHWULDO¶VOHJLWLPDF\$UJXDEO\
these innovations have brought about changes in how the trial process is legitimised, 
but that legitimisation ought to be understood as continuing in the liberal tradition.   
The chapter first considered two neoliberal paradigms of legitimacy, and 
FRQFOXGHGWKDW%URZQ¶VPDUNHW-centric approach could not handle the complicated set 
of imperDWLYHV SHFXOLDU WR FULPLQDO WULDO OHJLWLPDWLRQ 3DVVDYDQW¶V FULPLQDO-consumer 
double approach to state governance, despite having a far more suited analytical 
approach, is also of limited value in accounting for the victim-centric reforms.  
I then turned to consider liberal conceptions of legitimacy. First I considered 
7\OHU¶VVWDQFHZKLFKHVSRXVHGWKHFRQFHSWRISURFHGXUDOMXVWLFHZKHUHE\SURFHGXUDO
fairness to the victim outweighs even the perceived fairness of the outcome of the 
process, and consequently promotes active support for the process. By purporting to 
give victims a voice, enabling them to make themselves heard, either by challenging 
an unfavourable prosecutorial decision or by elucidating the impact of an offence at 
sentencing, the victim-centric reforms promote fairness in aspects of the procedure 
that were previously remote to the victim, provoking the requisite cooperation that is 
not usually theorised as part of the nature of homo oeconomicus. I next considered 
the dialogic and relational character of legitimacy advocated by Bottoms and Tankebe, 
who extolled the concept of legitimacy as a two-sided, evolving, perpetual discussion 
between the power-holder and the audience, whereby the audience responses 
provoke the power holder to modify their practices to maintain their legitimacy. The 
victim-centric reforms have responded to the needs of the victim to be more involved 
LQWKHSURFHHGLQJVE\H[SDQGLQJWKHDXGLHQFH¶VDELOLW\WRSDUWLFLSDWHDWNH\VWDJHVRI
the execution of power in the criminal trial.  
7KLVFKDSWHU¶V IXQGDPHQWDODUJXPHQW UHJDUGLQJ WKH IXQFWLRQRIYLFWLP-centric 
forms in relation to liberal conceptions of the trial takes on added significance in light 
of how little substantive difference they make to the trial. Recall that in chapters two 
and three I criticised the degree to which the victim in fact becomes involved in these 
two key stages of the criminal trial process as a result of the relevant reforms. The 
VRRS does not incorporate the victim into the actual decision whether to prosecute a 
suspect, but rather provides a right and mechanism to seek a review of a terminatory 
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decision. Similarly, VPSs do not change the sentencing exercise, beyond formalising 
the opportunity for the victim to state the impact of the offence on them. When seen 
through the paradigm of liberal accounts of the legitimacy of the trial, however, these 
reforms take on much more significance. The opening up of dialogues between those 
ZLWKWKHSRZHUDQGWKHYLFWLPVDVWKHµH[SDQGHG¶DXGLHQFHIRUWKHWULDODW these two 
crucial stages in the proceedings which were previously so remote to victims expands 





Chapter V. Conclusion 
This thesis has studied two victim-centric reforms, which are representative of a 
swathe of similar reforms in recent years, affecting the English criminal trial process. 
The purpose of this study has been first, to consider the seemingly neoliberal 
imperatives embodied in the reforms, second, to investigate what impact, if any, such 
reforms have had on the fundamentally liberal nature of the trial process and last, to 
consider their effect, if any, on the liberal account of the legitimacy of the criminal trial. 
In the first chapter, the development of the criminal trial was traced from trial by 
ordeal to adversarial conflict. In this chapter, it was demonstrated that the rise in the 
prominence of the defendant corresponded with the attendant fall in the role of the 
victim, and the emergence of the liberal SURFHGXUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQVWKDWXQGHUSLQWRGD\¶V
criminal trial. The more recent turn, both domestically and internationally, towards 
privileging victims, and the neoliberal motivations behind this change of direction were 
then considered.   
In the following two chapters, the VRRS and VPSs were examined in detail to 
illustrate the impact of victim-centrism on two distinct and different stages of the 
criminal trial, which hitherto had very little direct victim involvement.  
The VRRS affected the initial, pre-trial stage of the criminal process, through 
the creation of a specific mechanism for aggrieved victims to challenge a terminatory 
decision taken by the CPS not to prosecute the suspect. First, the evolution of the 
opportunity for a victim to challenge such a decision was considered, starting from 
such a challenge being an impossibility due to the conclusive nature of the 
determination in favour of the defendant, moving to the possibility of a complaint being 
PDGH WKURXJK WKH &36¶V JHQHUDO FRPSODLQWV¶ SURFedure. Second, the judgment in 
Killick,1 in which Lord Justice Thomas determined that there must be a right for a victim 
to seek a review of a decision not to prosecute, and criticised the lack of formal 
procedure to seek such a review, was considered. Third, the creation of the VRRS 
ZDV H[DPLQHG DQG LWV HIIHFWLYHQHVV LQ IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH YLFWLP¶V ULJKW WR UHYLHZ ZDV
considered. Fourth, the neoliberal imperatives embodied in the VRRS, including 
individualisation of processes away from those with power towards the individual 
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subject and responsibilisation of the individual, through empowerment were 
considered, along with the importation of consumerist concepts and zero-tolerance 
towards criminality in the content and promotion of the scheme. Last, it was argued 
that the VRRS does not encroach in any meaningful way on the liberal nature of the 
criminal trial. Critiques and statements in support were considered and it was 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHVFKHPH¶VOLPLWHGDPELWLQQRZD\DOWHUHGWKHUROHRIWKHYLFWLPLQ
the decision whether to mount a prosecution. 
The VPS scheme affected the latter, post-trial stage of the criminal trial process 
by formalising a mechanism for the victim to express to the sentencing tribunal the 
impact the offence has had on them and, if they so wish, provides the opportunity for 
the victim to read out their statement in court themselves. First, the limited role of the 
victim in the sentencing exercise, which focuses so heavily on the defendant, was 
considered. Second, the privileges bestowed upon the victim under the VPS scheme 
were articulated. Third, the neoliberal paradigms exhibited in this reform were 
considered. In particular, the individualisation of proceedings away from the defendant 
and towards the victim, the fostering of the responsibilisation of the victim by providing 
a mechanism to physically be heard in court at such a key stage in the proceedings 
and the personalisation of the process by appealing to the victim, in language that is 
indicative of a consumer being afforded enhanced rights, to recount the impact of the 
crime at a time when an offender, who poses a risk to society, will potentially be 
removed from society by incapacitation were all detailed as embodying neoliberal 
imperatives. Lastly the limited encroachment that this scheme has had on the liberal 
nature of the trial institution was averred.  
In the final chapter, this thesis considered the impact of these victim-centric 
reforms on the liberal account of the legitimacy of the criminal trial. Analyses of 
legitimation in terms of neoliberal, market-centric, consumerist models, although 
playing a textual role, were rejected as being deficient in fully handling the 
SDUWLFXODULWLHVRIWKHFULPLQDOWULDO¶VOHJLWLPDWLRQ which has a more complicated set of 
imperatives. Liberal accounts of legitimacy, with an emphasis on procedural justice 
and the dialogic and relational nature of legitimation between the power-holder and 
the audience, were deemed to remain more explanatory in understanding the 




Having considered two examples from a raft of victim-centric reforms that 
should be understood as part of the neoliberal tradition, this thesis concludes that the 
liberal nature of English trial proceedings is little changed by such reforms. What is 
changing is how the trial process is legitimised. Rather than destabilising or surpassing 
the liberal conception of the legitimacy of the criminal trial, this thesis concludes that 
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